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Chapter I.
INTRODUCTION
1. Introduction - Navigable waterways were once
among the primary arteries of transportation and commerce.
A substantial body of law developed in New York to help assure that rivers and streams would be accessible to perform
this important public role. Today, the public's navigation use
of streams is mainly recreational. This recreational use is valuable, however, not merely as an amenity enhancing the quality of life, but it also can be an important tourism resource
and economic benefit to many areas of the state. The laws
that regulate the public's right to pass over the state's navigable waterways have, therefore, acquired a renewed
importance.
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, a practice developed among many riparian landowners to close off public
access to smaller streams that had previously been open for
public use. This occurred despite the fact that New York's
statutory and case law have adhered consistently to the traditional common-law rule which entitles members of the public
to navigate upon all streams susceptible to such use. The very
persistence of the stream closing practices, however, raised
ambiguities in the popular perception concerning the public's
actual right to navigate through privately-owned lands.
1.1. Approach and Scope - This paper provides a
comprehensive survey of the New York judicial decisions
bearing on the public's right to use the state's navigable
streams and waterways. The cases have been organized into a
logical framework, in outline form, in order to give future researchers ready access to the relevant judicial materials.
Wherever possible, the main thrust of the cases has been
presented in the court's own words.1 Brief narrative summaries of the case law are provided under the main outline headings. An attempt has been made to include a reference to
1. In quoting passages from the cases, italics have frequently been added to
highlight key words and phrases.
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every New York case relevant to public use of freshwater
streams, along with a full and representative sample of cases
involving lakes and tidal waters.
Federal decisions are cited sparingly. Except where they
specifically involve New York law, most Federal decisions on
navigation are, at best, indirectly relevant to an understanding of the common law rules that apply in New York. To be
sure, congressional legislation could have a singularly major
impact on the rights of the public, or anyone else, to use New
York's waterways, but "until Congress intervenes in such
cases and exercises its authority, the power of the States is
plenary." Hamilton v. Vicksburg, S. & P. R.R., 119 U.S. 280,
281 (1886).
The New York cases on the public use of tidal waters are
far more numerous than those which consider public rights in
freshwater streams. Even though fresh and tidal waters are
subject to very different rules in questions of ownership, New
York courts have consistently "made no distinction against
the public right of passage and transportation." Fulton Light,
Heat & Power Co. v. New York, 200 N.Y. 400, 412, 94 N.E.
199, 202 (1911) (emphasis added). The courts themselves tend
to cite freshwater and tidal water cases indiscriminantly as
authorities for one another, especially in reference to the public right of passage. Because tidal water cases add reinforcement and useful elucidation of the lines of freshwater holdings, frequent references to tidal water cases have been
essential in order to present a complete picture of the New
York common law applicable to the fresh waters of the state.
1.2. Summary and Conclusions - The beds of New
York's freshwater streams are generally privately owned, but
the courts have always recognized that the private ownership
of underwater land is subject to a public right of passage
along any streams that are "navigable in fact". The cases declare that the public right is an "easement" to use streams as
a "highway", and they do not limit the public use to any particular purpose (such as commercial transport). When streamside owners act unilaterally to forbid public passage along
navigable streams, they violate the state's long-established
property interest in the stream, an interest held by the state
5
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under a public trust for the benefit of the People.
The Legislature has the power to declare that any stream
is a public highway for general use. Compensation must be
paid to the private streambed owners only if the stream is not
"navigable in fact". No compensation is required if the Legislature merely reaffirms the public's long-standing right of passage (and reasonably necessary incidental rights, such as
anchoring) on the state's actually navigable streams. To ratify
the public's historic rights of passage would impose no new
legal burden on landowners; it only reaffirms a right or "easement" which the state has owned, in trust, all along.
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Chapter II.
THE CONCEPT OF "NAVIGABILITY"
2. The Concept of "Navigability" - What counts as
"navigable" waters for various legal purposes can vary considerably depending on the context. As the United States Supreme Court has observed, "any reliance upon judicial precedent must be predicated upon a careful appraisal of the
purpose for which the concept of 'navigability' was invoked in
a particular case." Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S.
164, 171 (1979).
2.1 The Kinds of "Navigability" - A number of different definitions of "navigability" are recognized in New
York, federal and other United States cases. Each of these
definitions is applicable for a different purpose, for example,
determining United States admiralty jurisdiction, fixing the
reach of the federal commerce power, delimiting the so-called
navigation servitude exception to the Constitution's takings
clause, construing federal grants of riparian lands, interpreting state or pre-Revolution royal grants of riparian lands, and
establishing the public's right of passage under state law. See
Johnson & Austin, RecreationalRights and Titles to Beds on
Western Lakes and Streams, 7 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 (1967);
Annotation, Public Rights of Recreational Boating, Fishing,
Wading, or the Like in Inland Stream the Bed of Which is
Privately Owned, 6 A.L.R.4th 1030 (1981).
The two navigability concepts that play a key role in the
New York cases are:
a. Navigability in law, which is based on the English
common-law definition of navigable waters, i.e., those
which are tidal.
b. Navigability in fact, which is based on the waters' actual capacity for transportation and commerce by boats,
rafts, floating logs, etc.
2.2 Navigability in Law - In New York, the concept
of navigability in law is used chiefly to determine the ownership of underwater lands. In general, lands under waters that
are navigable in law are presumed to have been retained by
7

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6

the state (or king) when the original grants of the water-side
lands were made - unless, of course, a grant of such underwater lands was clearly intended. (For lands under waters
that are not navigable in law, the opposite presumption is
made, viz. that such underwater lands belong to the adjacent
upland owners. See infra Chapter III.)
Since Chancellor Kent's seminal dictum in Palmer v.
Mulligan, 3 Cai. R. 308, 318a-19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (Hudson
at Stillwater [fresh and non-tidal]), New York cases have generally followed the English precedents and have defined navigability in law to mean only those waters that are subject to
the ebb and flow of the tides. In accordance with this principle, most lands under tidal waters, including the tidal portion
of the Hudson River, are owned by the state; most lands
under the state's fresh waters are owned privately.
There is, incidentally, ample indication that Chancellor
Kent may have applied the English common law incorrectly
and that, in England, any water that was navigable in fact
was also navigable in law. See Waterford Elec. Light, Heat &
Power Co. v. New York, 208 A.D. 273, 275-76, 203 N.Y.S. 858,
861-62 (3d Dept. 1924), aff'd, 239 N.Y. 629, 147 N.E. 225
(1925) (Hudson at Van Schoenhoven rapids). Right or wrong,
however, Chancellor Kent's version of things "is now firmly
established in this State." Id. at 208 A.D. 281, 203 N.Y.S. 866.
In Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. v. New York, 200
N.Y. 400, 412, 94 N.E. 199, 202 (1911) (Oswego River), the
court wrote:
In law, the term 'navigable river' has received a technical
application to rivers, or arms of the sea, in which the tide
ebbs and flows. The common law of England regarded all
fresh water rivers as non-navigable .... The navigability,
in fact, of a stream had no relevancy to the question of
the title to the bed; it was relevant solely to the public
right to pass, or to transport, upon as upon a highway
(emphasis added).
In Smith v. Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463, 479 (1883) (Hemlock
Lake), the court approvingly quoted an extensive footnote to
Ex parte Jennings, 6 Cow. 518, 543 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826) to
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/7
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the effect that: "Rivers not navigable, that is fresh waters of
what kind soever, do of common right belong to the owners of
the soil adjacent to the extent of their land in length."
In People v. Tibbetts, 19 N.Y. 523, 526 (1859), it was said:
"If the Hudson was... a navigable stream at Troy,... then it
was the property of the people. A river is considered as an
arm of the sea, and as such navigable, so far as the tide rises
and falls. That is a technical rule of early establishment. .. "
(emphasis added). Incidentally, the fact that the water might
be fresh would not prevent it from being navigable in law provided that the requisite tidal influence was present. Id.
In Ex parte Jennings, 6 Cow. 518, 528 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1826), the court wrote:
By the term navigable river, the law does not mean such
as is navigable in common parlance. The smallest creek
may be so [navigable] to a certain extent, as well as the
largest river, without being legally a navigable stream.
The term has in law a technical meaning; and applies to
all streams, rivers or arms of the sea, where the tide ebbs
and flows (emphasis added).
See also State v. Bishop, 46 A.D.2d 654, 359 N.Y.S.2d
817, 820 (2d Dept. 1974). Referring to marshlands at the edge
of Moriches Bay (tidal), the court observed that: "[W]aters,
though not navigable in fact are deemed navigable in law
when they are shallow reaches of navigable bodies. Over such
waters the power of the State extends."
But cf.: A few twentieth century cases have held that
"[n]avigability in fact is the test of navigability in law." People ex rel. New York Cent. R.R. v. State Tax Comm'n, 258
A.D. 356, 360, 16 N.Y.S.2d 812, 817 (3d Dept. 1940), aff'd, 284
N.Y. 616, 29 N.E.2d 932 (1940) (citations omitted) (small
Hudson tributaries of Iona Bay, Doodletown Creek, and Popolopen Creek are navigable in fact), citing cases from the
United States Supreme Court; City of Albany v. State, 71
Misc. 2d 294, 297, 335 N.Y.S.2d 975, 979 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1972)
(dictum); Findley Lake Property Owners, Inc. v. Town of
Mina, 31 Misc. 2d 356, 378, 154 N.Y.S.2d 775, 796 (N.Y. Sup.
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Ct. 1956); Board of Hudson River Requlating Dist. v. Fonda,
J. & G.R. Co., 223 A.D. 358, 360, 228 N.Y.S. 686, 688 (3d
Dept. 1928), modified on other grounds, 249 N.Y. 445 k1928);
People ex rel. New York, 0. & W. Ry. v. State Tax Comm'n,
116 Misc. 774, 775, 191 N.Y.S. 464, 466 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1921)
(Susquehanna River: "The test of navigability in law, is navigability in fact"). There is not, however, clear twentieth century authority for applying this rule (which is the federal rule
and the majority American rule) in New York.
2.3 Navigability in Fact - Even if the bed of a
stream or lake is in private ownership, the public still has a
right of passage, as on a highway, if the stream or lake is navigable in fact. See infra § 4.3. This navigability in fact test is
entirely distinct from the ebb-and-flow test of navigability in
law. Navigability in fact means essentially what it says, and
the determinations of navigability in fact are, of course, factbound determinations. A variety of definitional criteria are
presented by the cases.
2.3.1. The Landmark New York Case - on navigability in fact is Morgan v. King, 35 N.Y. 454, 458-59 (1866), in
which the New York Court of Appeals (Court of Appeals)
wrote:
a river is, in fact,
By the common law of England, ...
navigable, on which boats, lighters or rafts may be floated
to market .... [However,] the rule of the common law, as
to what degree of capacity renders a river navigable, in
fact, should be received, in this country, with such modifications as will adapt it to the peculiar character of our
streams and the commerce for which they may be used..
. . [W]e have many streams, of considerable extent, not
navigable by boats, lighters or rafts, but capable of floating to market single logs or sticks of timber .... The true
rule is, that the public have a right of way in every stream
which is capable, in its natural state and its ordinary
volume of water, of transporting, in a condition fit for
market, the products of the forests or mines, or of the tillage of the soil upon its banks (emphasis added).
The Court of Appeals added that, to support the public right
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of way, it is not essential that:
- the property to be transported be carried in vessels (i.e.,
a capacity to float logs is sufficient);
- the stream be navigable both against as well as with the
current; or
- the navigation capacity be continuous, viz. in all seasons
of the year. Id. at 499.
"If it is so far navigable or floatable, in its natural state and
its ordinary capacity, as to be of public use in the transportation of property, the public claim to such use ought to be liberally supported." Id. (emphasis added).
Despite the breadth of its definition of navigable in fact,
the Court of Appeals in Morgan v. King declined to hold that
the Racquette River between Colton and Raymondsville was a
public highway. Id. at 460. In reaching that conclusion, the
court pointed to three factors: (1) the stream, in its natural
state, "was not capable of floating even single logs, except
during seasons of high-water, which were about two months in
a year," and, even then, the logs could not go down unassisted
or, for that matter, undamaged; (2) the stream had become
useful for transport only because the Legislature had provided
funds for "artificial improvements"; and (3) the Legislature
had provided that persons using the river for log transport
should pay the pre-existing dam owners for "such damages as
he or they might sustain" in altering the existing dams and
booms, but plaintiff was instead trying to force the dam alterations without paying. Id. at 460-61.
It is perhaps also notable that, according to the court, the
relevant section of the Racquette River "was not capable, at
any season, of being navigated by vessels, barges, lighters or
rafts." Id. at 456 (emphasis added).
2.3.2. Definitions Based on Commercial Use The potential of a stream for use in commerce has been repeatedly cited in New York as a basis for finding the stream
to be navigable in fact, beginning with the landmark case of
Morgan v. King, 35 N.Y. 453, 458-59 (1866) ("capable ... of
transporting [products] in a condition fit for market").
In Sawczyk v. United States Coast Guard, 499 F. Supp.
1034, 1039 (W.D.N.Y. 1980), the Falls-to-Lewiston reach of
11
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the Niagara River was found navigable in fact (and thus subject to United States admiralty jurisdiction) based in part on
commercial use in the form of regularly operated raft trips
(apparently recreational), stating that "the raft venture at issue in these cases evidences the continuing effort to exploit
the river commercially." The court added, "[it is not necessary that a waterway now be open and used commercially, if it
is susceptible of being used for transport and commerce
whatever the modes may be." Id. at 1040.
"[The bank is] a channel for useful commerce of a substantial and permanent character . . . ." People v. Waite, 103
Misc. 2d 204, 207, 425 N.Y.S.2d 462, 464 (St. Law. County Ct.
1979).
"[A] waterway is navigable in fact only when it is used, or
susceptible. of being used, in its natural and ordinary condition (emphasis in original), as a highway for commerce ....
(emphasis added)" Thornhill v. Skidmore, 32 Misc. 2d 320,
323, 227 N.Y.S.2d 793, 796 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961).
In Fairchild v. Kraemer, 11 A.D.2d 232, 235, 204
N.Y.S.2d 823, 825-26 (2d Dept. 1960), after stating that the
ebb-and-flow test does not apply, the court said that "a waterway is navigable in fact only when it is used, or susceptible of
being used, in its natural and ordinary condition, as a highway
for commerce over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water."
"The harbor is in fact navigable, not only by private
boats but by the smaller types of commercial craft, such as
fishing and oyster boats." People v. Kraemer, 7 Misc. 2d 373,
380, 164 N.Y.S.2d 423, 429 (Police Ct. Suff. County 1957),
afJ'd, 6 N.Y.2d 363, 160 N.E.2d 633, 189 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1959)
(quoting with approval from United States v. Appalachian
Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 416 (1940)).
"[Tihe creek and bay had both been actually navigable
commercially and for pleasure and . . . they still retain their
capacity for such use ....
Rivers are navigable in fact when
they are susceptible of being used in their ordinary condition
as highways of commerce." People ex rel. New York Cent.
R.R. v. State Tax Comm'n, 258 A.D. 356, 360-61, 16 N.Y.S.2d
812, 817 (3d Dept. 1940), aff'd, 284 N.Y. 616, 29 N.E.2d 932
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/7
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(1940) (emphasis added) (Iona Bay, Doodletown Creek, and
Popolopen Creek are navigable in fact). The court also quoted
from Economy Light Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113, 12223 (1921), stating that "[tihe capability of use by the public
for purposes of transportation and commerce affords the true
criterion of the navigability of a river, rather than the extent
and manner of that use."
"[The fact that the river is] used extensively for floating
logs and transporting logs and timber, products of the forests
along its banks.., is quite sufficient to establish its navigability." Finch, Pruyn & Co. v. State, 122 Misc. 404, 408, 203
N.Y.S. 165, 169 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1924) (Hudson at and above
Glens Falls).
"[Clapable in [their] natural state and in [their] ordinary
volume of water of transporting in a condition fit to market
the products of the forests and mines." Ten Eyck v. Town of
Warwick, 75 Hun. 562, 566 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2d Dept. 1894) (inlet to Greenwood Lake not navigable).
"[U]sed for rafting for twenty-six years and upwards ....
When a river is so far navigable as to be of public use in the
transportation of property, the public claim to such navigation ought to be liberally supported." Shaw v. Crawford, 10
Johns. 236, 237 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813).
2.3.3. Definitions Based on Recreational Use Usefulness in commerce has not been the only criterion used
to determine whether a stream is navigable in fact. A number
of more recent cases cite actual use of the waterway for recreational purposes as a basis for finding it to be navigable in
fact. Only one New York case has been found which suggests
(apparently as dictum), that a finding of navigability in fact
could not be based upon recreational use (Lewis v. Clark, 133
N.Y.S.2d 880 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954) discussed infra § 2.3.3).
In Trustees of Freeholders and Commonality of Southampton v. Heilner, 84 Misc. 2d 318, 328, 375 N.Y.S.2d 761,
770 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975), the court cited use by pleasure craft
as the primary evidence of navigability in fact, stating: "[iun
today's life it cannot be said that this use is less important to
society than commercial uses such as logging or transporting
produce across the water."
13
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"[I]t was traveled by pleasure boats and sport fishing
boats .. .[this is a] navigable stream." St. Lawrence Shores,
Inc. v. State, 60 Misc. 2d 74, 78, 302 N.Y.S.2d 606, 612 (N.Y.
Ct. Cl. 1969).
"[T]he fact that a stream has been used for pleasure
boating may be considered on the subject of the stream's capacity and the use of which it is susceptible." Fairchild v.
Kraemer, 11 A.D.2d 232, 235, 204 N.Y.S.2d 823, 826 (2d Dept.
1960).
"The creek and bay had both been actually navigable
commercially and for pleasure and . . .they still retain their
capacity for such use." People ex rel. New York Cent. R.R. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 258 A.D. 356, 360, 16 N.Y.S.2d 812, 817
(3d Dept. 1940), aff'd, 284 N.Y. 616, 29 N.E.2d 932 (1940)
(emphasis added) (Iona Bay, Doodletown Creek, and Popolopen Creek are navigable in fact).
"Nor is lack of commercial traffic a bar to the conclusion
of navigability where personal or private use by boats demonstrates the availability of the stream for the simpler types of
commercial navigation." People v. Kraemer, 7 Misc. 2d 373,
380, 164 N.Y.S.2d 423, 429 (Police Ct. Suff. County 1957)
(quoting with approval from United States v. Appalachian
Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 416 (1940)).
"Fleets of boats and canoes came down from which occupants would camp out overnight, or become guests of hotels
along the river." The river was held to be navigable. People ex
rel. New York, 0. & W. Ry. v. State Tax Comm'n, 116 Misc.
774, 777, 191 N.Y.S. 464, 467 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1921) (Susquehanna River).
See Sawczyk v. United States Coast Guard, 499 F. Supp.
1034, 1039 (W.D.N.Y. 1980), which found navigability in fact
based upon a regularly operated raft venture (apparently recreational) on the grounds that it "evidences the continuing effort to exploit the river commercially."
Contra:
Lewis v. Clark, 133 N.Y.S.2d 880, 898 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1954) "Mere depth of water, without profitable utility, will
not render a watercourse navigable in the legal sense, so as to
subject it to public servitude, nor will the fact that it is suffihttps://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/7
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cient for pleasure boating or to enable hunters and fishermen
to float their skiffs or canoes. To be navigable, a water course
must have a useful capacity as a public highway of transportation." (quoting Harrison v. Fite, 148 F. 781, 783-84 (8th Cir.
1906)).
2.3.4. Effect of Rapids or Other Obstacles to Navigation - Many cases recognize that places which cannot be
navigated are frequently found in otherwise navigable streams
or stretches of streams. However, it is invariably held that:
"The general character of a stream as to being navigable is
not changed by the fact that at a particular place it is not
navigable in fact by boats." People v. New York & Ontario
Power Co., 219 A.D. 114, 115, 219 N.Y.S. 497, 500 (3d Dept.
1927) (Niagara River at the falls).
In Sawczyk v. United States Coast Guard, 499 F. Supp.
1034, 1039 (W.D.N.Y. 1980), the Falls-to-Lewiston reach of
the Niagara River was found navigable in fact (and thus subject to United States admiralty jurisdiction) despite the fact
that portions of the river may be non-navigable. The fact
"that a river is difficult to navigate ... or even that it is 'interrupted by occasional natural obstructions' does not preclude a
finding of navigability in a legal sense." Id. at 1039-40.
"[T]he waters being navigable in part, must be deemed
navigable in whole." Hawkins v. State, 54 Misc. 2d 847, 852,
283 N.Y.S.2d 615, 621 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1967) (referring to the
navigability in fact of East Bay, a portion of Lake Ontario,
and holding it to be owned by the state, absent an express
grant).
"The interruption of navigability by the water falls in the
middle part of the river did not have any effect upon the legal
character of the stream." People v. System Properties, 281
A.D. 433, 444, 120 N.Y.S.2d 269, 279 (3d Dept. 1953), modified on other grounds, 2 N.Y.2d 330, 141 N.E.2d 429, 160
N.Y.S.2d 859, (1957) (Ticonderoga River is navigable).
"Navigability is not destroyed because of occasional natural obstructions or portages, nor it is necessary that navigation
continue at all seasons of the year . . ." People ex rel. Erie
R.R. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 A.D. 452, 454, 43 N.Y.S.2d
189, 191 (3d Dept. 1943), aff'd, 293 N.Y. 900, 60 N.E.2d 31
15
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(1944).
The general character of a stream as to being navigable is
not changed by the fact that at a particular place it is not
in fact navigable by boats ....A public right on a stream
is a right of travel as on a public highway. It is not necessary that in order to be navigable the stream should admit the passage of boats at all times and at all portions of
the stream.
People ex rel. New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n,
258 A.D. 356, 361, 16 N.Y.S.2d 812, 817 (3d Dept. 1940), aff'd,
284 N.Y. 616, 29 N.E.2d 932 (1940) (Iona Bay, Doodletown
Creek and Popolopen Creek are navigable in fact).
"[T]he Niagara River, being navigable in part, is thus
navigable in whole, so far as the control of the river for purposes of commerce and navigation is concerned." Niagara
Falls Power Co. v. Water Power and Control Comm'n, 267
N.Y. 265, 270, 196 N.E. 51, 53 (1935).
"Rifts and shallows do not affect its general character as
a navigable stream . . . ." New York Power & Light Corp. v.
New York, 230 A.D. 338, 342, 245 N.Y.S. 44, 49 (3d Dept.
1930).
The Seneca River is navigable in fact "notwithstanding
interruption of its navigability at places by rapids or obstructions." James Frazee Milling Co. v. State, 122 Misc. 545, 547,
204 N.Y.S. 645, 648 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1924).
"The criterion is the adaptability of the river in its entirety for the purposes of transportation in and about the locality of the place in question." West Virginia Pulp & Paper
Co. of Delaware v. Peck, 189 A.D. 286, 292, 178 N.Y.S. 663,
667 (3d Dept. 1919).
"In order to be navigable, it is not necessary that it [a
stream] should be deep enough to admit passage of boats at
all portions of the stream." Danes v. New York, 219 N.Y. 67,
71, 113 N.E. 786, 787 (1916).
Cf. State v. Bishop, 46 A.D.2d 654, 359 N.Y.S.2d 817, 820
(2d Dept. 1974): "[Wjaters, though not navigable in fact are
deemed navigable in law when they are shallow reaches of
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/7
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navigable waters. Over such waters the power of the State
extends."
See also:
Niagara Falls Power Co. v. Duryea, 185 Misc. 696, 704,
57 N.Y.S.2d 777, 784 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1945) (the Niagara River
is "a navigable stream even at the point of the falls.").
People ex rel. New York 0. & W. Ry. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 116 Misc. 774, 775, 191 N.Y.S. 464, 466 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1921) (Susquehanna River "It is not necessary that, in order to be navigable, the river should be deep enough to admit
the passage of boats at all portions of the stream.").
Finch Pruyn & Co. v. State, 122 Misc. 404, 408, 203
N.Y.S. 165, 169 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1924) (Hudson at and above
Glens Falls).
Powell v. City of Rochester, 93 Misc. 227, 232-33, 157
N.Y.S. 109, 113 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1916) (Genesee River: "[T]he
fact that certain parts of it were never navigable does not alter its character as a navigable stream and a public
highway.").
In re Comm'rs of State Reservation at Niagara, 37 Hun.
537, 547-48 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 5th Dept. 1885) ("[T]he fact that
at the particular place in the river is not navigable by reason
of the interruption produced by the falls does not qualify or
distinguish it in that locality as a public river from it general
character.").
2.3.5. Effect of Variations in a Stream's Capacity
for Navigation - Natural water levels fluctuate and a waterway's capacity for navigation fluctuates with them. In Morgan v. King, 35 N.Y. 454, 458-59 (1866), one of the few cases
to consider this point, the Court of Appeals seemed to stress
seasonal regularity of navigable capacity rather than constancy of capacity:
If [a stream] is ordinarily subject to periodical fluctuations in the volume and height of its water, attributable
to natural causes, and recurring as regularly as the seasons, and if its periods of high water or navigable capacity, ordinarily, continue a sufficient length of time to
make it useful as a highway, it is subject to the public
17
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easement.

Id. at 459.
Two earlier cases, both cited in Morgan v. King, indicate
that a stream cannot be considered navigable if it practically
has to be raining for any navigation capability to exist. Curtis
v. Keesler, 14 Barb. 511, 518 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1852) (Callicoon
Creek is non-navigable, usable only "an aggregate of some
four weeks in the year, when swollen . . . ."); and Munson v.
Hungerford, 6 Barb. 265, 270 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1849) (Black
River non-navigable between Carthage and Dexter): "It is not
enough that a stream is capable, (during a period in aggregate
of from two to four weeks in the year when it is swollen by the
spring and autumn freshets), of carrying down its rapid course
whatever may have been thrown upon its angry waters ......
It is unlikely, however, that these durational requirements for navigability in fact would affect very many streams
that are worthwhile for either commercial or recreational
boating. Although whitewater enthusiasts may find certain
streams interesting only during the times of spring rains and
snow-melt, a stream's capacity for navigation does not depend
on its being interesting as whitewater, but rather on its being
reasonably passable.
See also:
People ex rel. Erie R.R. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 A.D.
452, 454, 43 N.Y.S.2d 189, 191 (3d Dept. 1943), aff'd, 293 N.Y.
900, 60 N.E.2d 31 (1944) ("[N]or is it necessary that the navigation continue at all seasons of the year ....
).
James Frazee Milling Co. v. State, 122 Misc. 545, 547,
204 N.Y.S. 645, 648 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1924) (Seneca River navigable in fact) ("[N]or need the navigation be open at all seasons
of the year or at all stages of water.").
Ten Eyck v. Town of Warwick, 75 Hun. 562, 566 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1894) (inlet to Greenwood Lake not navigable)
("Neither is it essential that the floatable capacity must be
continuous. If it be ordinarily and subject to fluctuations in
volume attributable to natural causes, and occurring with regularity and continuing sufficiently long to make it useful as a
highway, it is subject to public use.").
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/7

18

19891

PUBLIC RIGHTS

2.3.6. Other Definitional Statements of Navigability in Fact - confirm the view that, if a stream is naturally usable for travel in boats, it is navigable in fact and,
therefore, legally available for such use.
"[Tihe paramount factor . . . is not the actual use to
which a stream has been put, or the purpose of its use that is
important, but rather its capacity for use and its susceptibility
for use (in its original state or condition) for trade, commerce,
or travel." Fairchild v. Kraemer, 11 A.D.2d 232, 235, 204
N.Y.S.2d 823, 826 (2d Dept. 1960) (emphasis added) (action
by the bed-owner for trespass).
"[T]he river has been used by row boats, and canoes ...
for traffic, fishing and trapping." People ex rel. Erie R.R. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 266 A.D. 452, 454, 43 N.Y.S.2d 189, 191
(3d Dept. 1943), aff'd, 293 N.Y. 900, 60 N.E.2d 31 (1944).
A stream "does not lose this characteristic [of navigability] even if it has fallen into disuse for a hundred years. 'A
hundred years is a brief space in the life of a nation'. . . ." Id.
at 454, 43 N.Y.S.2d at 191-92.
"[A] sufficient amount of water . . .to allow the navigation of small boats and that... salt hay, hoop poles and hundreds of cords of wood were carried out of the creek by means
of boats and rafts, and that small boats have navigated the
creek ...." People ex rel. New York Cent. R.R. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 258 A.D. 356, 360, 16 N.Y.S.2d 812, 816 (3d Dept.
1940), aff'd, 284 N.Y. 616 (1940) (Iona Bay, Doodletown
Creek, and Popolopen Creek are navigable in fact).
"Fishermen still continue to navigate the stream in small
boats .... Streams so shallow as to accommodate small size
craft only are now determined to be navigable in fact." People
ex rel. New York Cent. R.R. v. State Tax Comm'n, 238 A.D.
267, 268, 264 N.Y.S. 285, 286 (3d Dept. 1933) (emphasis
added) (Roeliff Jansen's Kill - also tidal).
"Motor boats, rowboats, rafts and skiffs navigate the two
streams [Cascadilla Creek and Six Mile Creek]." People ex
rel. Lehigh Valley R.R. v. State Tax Comm'n, 247 N.Y. 9, 11,
159 N.E. 703, 705 (1928).
"Nor does the fact that the river was not used for transportation of logs and timber until after the issue of the grant
19
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affect the question of navigability at the time of such issue.
The river at that time was susceptible of the use to which it
was afterward subjected . . . ." Finch, Pruyn & Co. v. State,
122 Misc. 404, 408, 203 N.Y.S. 165, 169 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1924)
(emphasis added) (Hudson at and above Glens Falls).
"The capacity to float logs, singly or together, to run rafts
however small, gives to all the public this easement . .. ."
People ex rel. New York 0. & W. Ry. v. State Tax Comm'n,
116 Misc. 774, 776, 191 N.Y.S. 464, 467 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1921)
(Susquehanna River).
"It is urged [that] ... the Seneca River being a navigable
stream, it did not lose its navigable character because of any
obstructions which were permitted to exist therein or over the
same .... We think the position thus taken . . . is correct."
Lehigh Valley R.R. v. Canal Board, 146 A.D. 151, 158-59, 130
N.Y.S. 978, 982-83 (4th Dept. 1911), aff'd, 204 N.Y. 471
(1912).
"Whether salt, or fresh, water streams, if they were large
enough to be capable of common passage and thus, in fact,
were navigable, they were regarded as common highways,
which might not be impeded." Fulton Light, Heat & Power
Co. v. New York, 200 N.Y. 400, 412, 94 N.E. 199, 202 (1911).
Because some products may be floated to market as rafts
and upon rafts, it is not essential to the public character
of the stream that property can be carried in vessels ....
As some streams are unnavigable against their current, if
they are floatable in their natural state, so as to be of
public use with the current, their public character is liberally supported.
Ten Eyck v. Town of Warwick, 75 Hun. 562, 566 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1894) (inlet to Greenwood Lake not navigable).
"[N]avigable by small vessels." Crooked Lake Nav. Co. v.
Keuka Nav. Co., 4 N.Y. St. Rep. 380, 383 (Sup. Ct. 5th Dept.
1887) aff'd, 115 N.Y. 667, 22 N.E. 1126 (1889) (Keuka Lake
navigable).
"[R] ivers of sufficient magnitude and capacity for navigation are public highways, and ... [the rights of private owners
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/7
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are] . . . subject to the easement of the public, which they
cannot lawfully interrupt." In re Comm'rs of St. Reservation
at Niagara, 37 Hun. 537, 545 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 5th Dept. 1885).
"It is not necessary that the stream should be navigable
through its whole length. The public may use such portions of
it as are navigable . . . ." Curtis v. Keesler, 14 Barb. 511, 518
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1852) (holding Callicoon Creek unnavigable,
relying on the "uncontrovertible principles of the common
law" on stream ownership as pronounced by Lord Hale).
"[N]avigable for vessels, boats, lighters, and as it has also
been held, for rafts." Munson v. Hungerford, 6 Barb. 265, 269
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1849) (holding the Black River non-navigable
between Carthage and Dexter).
"[W]hether they are susceptible or not of use as common
passage for the public." People v. Platt, 17 Johns. 195, 211
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819).
2.4. Statutory/Regulatory Definitions of "Navigation" or "Navigable" - For various purposes, the Legislature or administrative agencies acting under statutory mandate have classified waters in terms of "navigability" in order
to define the applicability of particular legislative programs.
In general, the concepts of navigability for such purposes are
fairly close to the common-law concept of navigable in fact. It
is important to note, however, that the various statutory/regulatory definitions of navigability are not necessarily identical
to the common law concept. The cases elaborating on the former may, therefore, not necessarily have any relevance to the
public right of passage.
2.4.1. The New York Navigation Law - defines
"navigable waters of the state" to mean: "all lakes, rivers,
streams and waters within the boundaries of the state and not
privately owned, which are navigable in fact or upon which
vessels are operated, except the tidewaters of Nassau and Suffolk Counties." N.Y. Nay. Law § 2[4] (McKinney 1941 &
Supp. 1989) (emphasis added). The same statute defines
"navigable in fact" as:
navigable in its natural or unimproved condition, affording a channel for useful commerce of a substantial and
21
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permanent character conducted in the customary mode of
trade and travel on water. A theoretical or potential navigability, or one that is temporary, precarious or unprofitable is not sufficient, but to be navigable in fact a lake or
stream must have practical usefulness to the public as a
highway for transportation.
N.Y. Nav. Law § 2[5] (McKinney 1941 & Supp. 1989).
The Navigation Law does not have any provisions of direct bearing on the public's right of passage. These definitions
establishing the scope of the Navigation Law do not purport
to affect the common-law definitions of navigability for purposes of the public's right of passage.
2.4.2. The Department of Environmental Conservation Regulations - define "navigable waters of the
state" to mean:
all lakes, rivers, streams and other bodies of water in the
State which are navigable in fact or upon which vessels
with a capacity of one or more persons can be operated. It
shall not include waters which are surrounded by land
held in single private ownership at every point in their
total area.
6 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, § 608.1(h) (1984).
2.4.3. Federal Definitions - Because they define the
reach of federal authority to regulate the nation's navigable
waterways, these definitions of navigability tend to be broadly
framed, e.g.:
[Tihe Genesee River is 'navigable waters' from Rochester
to Mount Morris, if (1) it presently is being used or is
suitable for use, or (2) it has been used or was suitable for
use in the past, or (3) it could be made suitable for use in
the future by reasonable improvements.
Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 344
F.2d 594, 596 (2d Cir. 1965) (Genesee navigable at Rochester,
but not shown to be navigable at Mount Morris, for purposes
of Federal Power Act and Rivers and Harbors Act).
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/7
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The most important distinction between New York's
common law definition and the federal definition is that, at
least since 1940, the latter also considers artificial improvements that enhance, presently or prospectively, a stream's
usefulness for transportation. See the federal landmark case,
United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377,
407-10 (1940). It remains to be seen whether the New York
courts will similarly expand upon their own traditional common law definition (which traditionally considers only the
natural condition of the stream). For a positive sign, see People v. System Properties,281 A.D. 433, 443, 120 N.Y.S.2d 269,
278-279 (3d Dept. 1953) (Ticonderoga River is navigable),
modified on other grounds, 2 N.Y.2d 330, 141 N.E.2d 429, 160
N.Y.S.2d 859 (1957).
While the federal definition of "natural" navigability is
itself very broad, the Court of Appeals has observed that "the
New York definition may be even broader." Van Cortlandtv.
New York Cent. R.R., 265 N.Y. 249, 255, 192 N.E. 401, 402
(1934) (Croton River).
2.4.4. Other Statutory Definitions - occasionally
appear in the cases. Again, it should be remembered that
these statutory interpretations do not necessarily have any
bearing whatsoever on the common law concept of "navigability in fact" for purposes of the public right of passage. For
example:
Brant Lake Shores, Inc. v. Barton, 61 Misc. 2d 902, 907,
307 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970) (construing a
legislative declaration that a certain stream and lake were
"public highways for the purpose of floating logs, timber and
lumber down those streams"; the court held that the legislature did not thereby mandate use for swimming or boating).
Van Cortlandt v. New York Cent. R.R., 265 N.Y. 249,
254, 254 N.E. 401, 402 (1934) (railroad charter requiring movable bridges over "navigable" streams; the court held it inapplicable to Croton River).
2.5. Specific Streams and Waterbodies - under the
common law definitions:
2.5.1. Held or Said to be Navigable in Fact:
Ausable River - Brewster v. J. & J. Rogers Co., 169 N.Y.
23
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73, 78, 62 N.E. 164, 165 (1901).
Battenkill - Shaw v. Crawford, 10 Johns. 236, 237 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1813).
Canandaigua Lake - Granger v. City of Canandaigua,
257 N.Y. 126, 132, 177 N.E. 394, 396 (1931).
Canisteo River - Browne & Jamison v. Scofield, 8 Barb.
239, 243 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1850).
Cascadilla Creek - People ex rel. Lehigh Valley Ry. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 247 N.Y. 9, 12, 159 N.E. 703, 705 (1928)
(motor boats, rowboats, rafts, skiffs).
Cayuga Lake - Stewart v. Turney, 237 N.Y. 117, 120,
142 N.E. 437, 438 (1923) (also mentions Canaderaga, Cazenovia, Cranberry, Cross, George, Oneida, Onondaga, Otisco,
Otsego, Owasco, Saranac, Saratoga, Schroon, Skaneateles and
Tupper Lakes as navigable in fact); New York State Water
Resources Comm'n v. Liberman, 37 A.D.2d 484, 488, 326
N.Y.S.2d 284, 288 (3d Dept. 1971).
Chemung River - Bacorn v. State, 20 Misc. 2d 369, 372,
195 N.Y.S.2d 214, 217 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1959); People ex rel. Erie
R.R. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 A.D. 452, 455, 43 N.Y.S.2d
189, 192 (3d Dept. 1943), aff'd, 293 N.Y. 900, 60 N.E.2d 31
(1944).
Chenango River - Chenango Bridge Co. v. Paige, 83
N.Y. 178, 185 (1886).
Crooked Creek - St. Lawrence Shores v. State, 60 Misc.
2d 74, 79, 302 N.Y.S.2d 606, 612 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1969).
Doodletown Bight - People ex rel. New York Cent. R.R.
v. State Tax Comm'n, 258 A.D. 356, 361, 16 N.Y.S.2d 812, 818
(3d Dept. 1940), aff'd, 284 N.Y. 616, 29 N.E.2d 932 (1940).
Genesee River - People ex rel. Western New York & P.
Ry. v. State Tax Comm'n, 244 N.Y. 596, 597, 155 N.E. 911,
912 (1927).
Hemlock Lake - Smith v. Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463, 474
(1883).
Hudson River - Finch, Pruyn & Co. v. State, 122 Misc.
404, 408, 203 N.Y.S. 165, 169 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1924) (at and above
Glens Falls).
Iona Creek Bay - People ex rel. New York Cent. R.R. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 258 A.D. 356, 361, 16 N.Y.S.2d 812, 818
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/7

24

1989]

PUBLIC RIGHTS

(3d Dept. 1940), aff'd, 284 N.Y. 616, 29 N.E.2d 932 (1940).
Island Creek - People v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213
N.Y. 194, 198, 107 N.E. 506 (1914).
Keuka Lake - Crooked Lake Nay. Co. v. Keuka Nav.
Co., 4 N.Y. St. Rep. 380, 383 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 5th Dept. 1887)
aff'd, 115 N.Y. 667, 22 N.E. 1126 (1889).
Mohawk River - Danes v. New York, 219 N.Y. 67, 70,
113 N.E. 786, 787 (1916).
Niagara River - Sawczyk v. United States Coast Guard,
499 F. Supp. 1034, 1039 (W.D.N.Y. 1980) (Falls to Lewiston;
even though "forbidding and dangerous"); See also Niagara
Falls Power Co. v. Water Power and Control Comm'n, 267
N.Y. 265, 270, 196 N.E. 51, 53 (1935); Commissioners of the
State Reserv. at Niagara,37 Hun. 537, 547 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 5th
Dept. 1885).
Peekskill Bay - People ex rel. New York Cent. R.R. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 239 N.Y. 183 (1924).
Popolopen Creek - People ex rel. New York Cent. R.R.
v. State Tax Comm'n, 258 A.D. 356, 361, 16 N.Y.S.2d 812, 818
(3d Dept. 1940), aff'd, 284 N.Y. 616, 29 N.E.2d 932 (1940).
Oswego River - Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. v. New
York, 200 N.Y. 400, 412, 94 N.E.2d 199, 202 (1911) (certain
stretches other than at Fulton).
Roeliff Jansen's Kill - People ex rel. New York Cent.
R.R. v. State Tax Comm'n, 238 A.D. 267, 268, 264 N.Y.S. 285,
286 (3d Dept. 1933) (also tidal).
Salmon River (near Lake Ontario) - Hooker v. Cummings, 20 Johns. 90, 100-01 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822).
Seneca River - James Frazee Milling Co. v. State, 122
Misc. 545, 547, 204 N.Y.S. 645, 648 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1924); Lehigh
Valley R.R. v. Canal Board, 69 Misc. 251, 255, 125 N.Y.S. 227,
230, aff'd, 146 A.D. 151, 158, 130 N.Y.S. 978, 982 (4th Dept.
1911), aff'd, 204 N.Y. 471, 97 N.E. 964 (1912).
Six Mile Creek - People ex rel. Lehigh Valley Ry. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 247 N.Y. 9, 159 N.E. 703, 705 (1928).
Susquehanna River - People ex rel. New York, 0. & W.
Ry. v. State Tax Comm'n, 116 Misc. 774, 775, 191 N.Y.S. 464,
466 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1921) (from Otsego Lake throughout its
course).
25
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Ticonderoga River - People v. System Properties, 281
A.D. 433, 443, 120 N.Y.S.2d 269, 279 (3d Dept. 1953), modified on other grounds, 2 N.Y.2d 330, 141 N.E.2d 429, 160
N.Y.S.2d 859 (1957).
2.5.2. Held or Said to be Non-navigable in Fact:
Black River - Munson v. Hungerford, 6 Barb. 265, 270
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1849) (Carthage to Dexter).
Callicoon Creek - Curtis v. Keesler, 14 Barb. 511, 518
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Spec T. 1852).
Crumhorn Lake - Mix v. Tice, 164 Misc. 261, 266, 298
N.Y.S. 441, 447 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1937).
,Greenwood Lake - Ten Eyck v. Town of Warwick, 75
Hun. 562, 567 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2d Dept. 1894) (not a highway
from one town to another).
Honeoye Creek - Smith v. Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463, 475
(1883).
Oswego River - Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. v. New
York, 200 N.Y. 400, 412, 94 N.E.2d 199, 202 (1911) (at
Fulton).
Peekskill Creek - People ex rel. New York Cent. R.R. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 239 N.Y. 183, 186, 146 N.E. 197, 198
(1924).
Racquette River - Morgan v. King, 35 N.Y. 454, 458
(1866) (Colton to Raymondsville).
Saranac River - People v. Platt, 17 Johns. 195, 216
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819).
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Chapter III.
OWNERSHIP OF STREAMBEDS
3. Ownership of Streambeds - The ownership question has been the primary litigated issue in the New York
cases that deal with the public's rights in navigable waters. It
is clear, by the way, that state law rather than federal law
controls this issue:
The long-settled rule is that the states, and not the federal government, hold title to the subaqueous land within
their boundaries and have the concomitant power to determine the nature and extent of the interests adjacent
land owners and others may acquire, subject only to the
dominant federal right of navigation.
United States v. Kane, 602 F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1979). See
United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229
U.S. 53, 60 (1913) (state law controls on issue of ownership).
In New York, title to streambed lands depends fundamentally, like all land titles, on the history and proper interpretation of the chain of conveyances beginning with the root
of title. The roots of land titles in New York are usually the
original grants from either the state or from the colonial rep-'
resentatives of the British monarch. The critical question with
respect to underwater lands is generally whether the original
grantor intended to include such lands in the grant when the
adjacent uplands were conveyed into private ownership. This
question is, in principle, one of interpreting the conveyance
but, as a practical matter, the grantor's intention is usually
established by a legal presumption.
Under the traditional English common-law rule, now followed in New York, the legal presumption favors the riparian
owners: absent an express intent to the contrary, grants of
land on non-tidal streams are presumed intended to run to
the center of the stream, irrespective of the stream's capacity
for navigation in fact. This is in contrast to the dominant
American rule, under which all lands beneath actually navigable non-tidal waters are presumed to be still retained as prop27
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256-57 (Clark

ed. 1967).
The earliest New York cases wavered between these two
rules of interpretation. Despite Chancellor Kent's strong but
possibly misconceived seminal endorsement of the English
rule in 1805 (See supra § 2.2), the dominant American rule
almost became the law of New York. Indeed, in 1865 the
Court of Appeals declared "as the settled law of the State"
that the beds of "generally navigable" freshwater streams belong to the state. People ex rel. Loomis v. Canal Appraisers,
33 N.Y. 461, 479-81, 500 (1865). See infra section 3.2.1.2.
However, the effect of this ruling was later limited to the
Hudson and Mohawk Rivers. Smith v. Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463,
481-82 (1883). With the exception of those two rivers, the
boundary rivers and large lakes, the beds of New York's fresh
waters are now generally deemed to be in private ownership,
having been conveyed to private owners as part of the grants
of the riparian lands. See Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. v.
New York, 200 N.Y. 400, 416, 94 N.E. 199, 203 (1911) ("[A]
rule, which, by [its] long standing, has acquired the stability
of a rule of property"; bed of Oswego is private); Waterford
Elec. Light, Heat & Power Co. v. New York, 208 A.D. 273,
281, 203 N.Y.S. 858, 866-67 (3d Dept. 1924), aff'd, 239 N.Y.
629, 147 N.E. 225 (1925) (English rule is "now firmly established" except as to Hudson and Mohawk).
Even while most lands under New York's rivers and lakes
are in private ownership, it must be emphasized that the familiar concept of ownership applies in only a very qualified
way to land beneath waters that are navigable in fact. As
Chancellor Kent himself wrote in support of his historic dictum, private title to the beds of fresh, non-tidal rivers can be
"granted without any public inconvenience, because the right
of the public, to the use of the water for navigation would remain incontestible." Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai. R. 307, 319-20
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (Hudson at Stillwater). Moreover, as the
Court of Appeals later noted in finally embracing the English
rule:
When it is considered that the rights and interests of the
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/7
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public, such as fishing, ferrying and transportation,are
preserved in all navigable waters by the inherent and inalienable attributes of the sovereign, it would seem to follow that the controversies which have arisen over nominal
ownership of the soil under such waters have magnified
beyond the real interests involved.
Smith v. City of Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463, 480 (1883) (emphasis
added). Much of the confusion about the public's right of passage over streams has arisen, no doubt, because these major
qualifications on private streambed ownership are often
overlooked.
3.1. The English Law on Streambed Titles - is
relevant in two respects:
(1) the common law in New York has been heavily influenced by the English doctrines on public/private rights in
streams. Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. v. New York,
200 N.Y. 400, 412-13, 94 N.E. 199, 202 (1911). New York
is, indeed, one of the few states which has adopted the
English rules rather than the now-dominant American
rules for determining streambed titles.
(2) many titles to specific riparian lands originated as
conveyances from the British monarch in colonial times;
the interpretation of these conveyances - though, in
principle, a matter of New York colonial law - is primarily (but not entirely) controlled by the doctrines applicable in England at the time the conveyances were made.
See Danes v. New York, 219 N.Y. 67, 72-75, 113 N.E. 786,
787-88 (1916).
As a general matter, the English law regarded freshwater
rivers to be in private ownership:
Fresh rivers of what kind soever, do of common right belong to the owners of the soil adjacent so that the owners
of the one side have of common right the propriety of the
soil, and consequently the right of fishing, usque filum
aquae;2 and the owners of the other side the right of soil
or ownership and fishing unto the filum aqua on their
2. I.e., to the "thread" or middle of the stream.
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side. And if a man be owner of the land of both sides, in
common presumption he is owner of the whole river, and
hath the right of fishing according to the extent of his
land in length. With this agrees the common experience.
Hargrave's Hale, De Jure Maris, ch. I (quoted at length in
People ex rel. Loomis v. Canal Appraisers, 33 N.Y. 461, 469
(1865)).
3.1.1. The "Jus Privatum" and the "Jus Publicum"
- Following the lead of the English common law, the New
York cases recognize that the sovereign ownership of underwater land is divided into two distinct components, the socalled "jus privatum" or private right and the "jus publicum"
or public right. The court in People v. Steeplechase Park Co.,
218 N.Y. 459, 472-73, 113 N.E. 521, 524 (1916), explained as
follows:
A distinction was taken between mere ownership of the
soil under water and the control over it for public purposes. The ownership of the soil, analogous to the ownership of dry land, was regarded as jus privatum, and was
vested in the crown. But the right to use and control both
the land and the water was deemed a jus publicum, and
was vested in Parliament. [Quoting Langdon v. Mayor, 93
N.Y. 129, 154-55 (1883).] In this country, the state has
succeeded to all rights of both crown and Parliament in
the navigable waters and the soil under them, and here
the jus privatum and the jus publicum are both vested in
the state.
People v. Steeplechase Park, 218 N.Y. 459, 473, 113 N.E. 521,
524 (1916). The term jus publicum is sometimes used loosely
to refer to "the rights of the general public ... to use navigable waters ... for fishing, boating and other lawful purposes."
Durham v. Ingrassia,105 Misc. 2d 191, 431 N.Y.S.2d 917, 922
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980). See also Tucci v. Salzhauer, 40 A.D.2d
712, 336 N.Y.S.2d 721, 723 (2d Dept. 1972), aff'd, 33 N.Y.2d
854, 307 N.E.2d 256, 352 N.Y.S.2d 854 (1973); and People of
Smithtown v. Poveromo, 71 Misc. 2d 524, 531, 336 N.Y.S.2d
764, 773-74 (Sup. Ct. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 79 A.D.2d
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/7
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42, 359 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1973) (Nissequogue River) ("rights of
navigation, travel along the foreshore, fishing and bathing").
In Povermo, the court also said, in a somewhat different vein,
that "the jus publicum is nothing more than the great police
power of the state." Povermo, 71 Misc. 2d 524, 534, 336
N.Y.S.2d 764, 776. See also Arnold's Inn, Inc. v. Morgan, 63
Misc. 2d 279, 283, 310 N.Y.S.2d 541, 547 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970),
modified, 35 A.D.2d 989, 317 N.Y.S.2d 989 (2d Dept. 1970).
In the discussion of this section on ownership of
streambeds, the "ownership" being discussed is the basic fee
simple ownership, or jus privatum.
3.1.2. The Public Trust Doctrine - At an earlier
time, the English monarchs apparently found irresistible the
temptation to pick up extra cash by selling off bits and pieces
of the navigable tidewaters surrounding the British Isles. In
order to mitigate the effects of these transactions on the public at large, the so-called "Public Trust" Doctrine emerged.
As a New York court has explained: "The title to lands
under tide waters, within the realm of England, were, by the
common law, deemed to be vested in the king as a public
trust, to subserve and protect the public right to use them as
common highways for commerce, trade and intercourse." People v. New York & Staten Island Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71, 76
(1877) (emphasis added). In other words, "the king, as parens
patriae,owned the [submerged] soil.., not for his own benefit, but for the benefit of his subjects at large ... and he can
not now deprive his subjects of these rights by granting the
public navigable waters to individuals." Lansing v. Smith, 4
Wend. 9, 20-21 (N.Y. 1829) (emphasis added).
The main point of the English Public Trust Doctrine was
to prevent the king from destroying the public's right of passage and fishing. If he conveyed trust lands into private ownership, the grantee took subject to the jus publicum unless
the king had Parliament'sconsent to convey a free and clear
title. Id. The doctrine was, in short, a check on royal whims.
In New York, the notion frequently appears in the cases
that the state holds certain of its lands, especially the underwater lands, subject to a public trust. Indeed, the public trust
has even been expanded to embrace not merely tidal waters,
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as in England, but also rivers, e.g., Fulton Light, Heat &
Power Co. v. New York, 200 N.Y. 400, 418, 94 N.E. 199, 204
(1911), and lakes, e.g., Granger v. City of Canandaigua,257
N.Y. 126, 132, 177 N.E. 394, 396 (1931). However, the public
trust is no check on sovereignty. The law is clear that the Legislature, as successor to both the king and Parliament, has the
power to convey underwater lands into private hands free of
the public trust and free of the public right of passage. See
infra § 4.6. There are some qualifications (See infra § 4.6.4),
but they exist because of public policy, not because of a public
trust.
Some representative judicial discussion of the public trust
concept in New York follows:
The corpus of the trust encompasses public lands and
navigable waters, the people represent the cestui que
trust, and the sovereign is the trustee. It is the unqualified duty of the trustee to preserve the trust corpus for
the benefit of the people (jus publicum). The jus publicum is nothing more than the great police power of the
people.
People of Smithtown v. Poveromo, 71 Misc. 2d 524, 534, 336
N.Y.S.2d 764, 776 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972), rev'd on other
grounds, 79 Misc. 2d 42, 359 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1973) (Nissequogue River).
"[W]hile conveyance of lands under water for a public
purpose is permissible because it accords with the public
trust, purpose is not the determinative factor." Riviera Ass'n,
Inc. v. North Hempstead, 52 Misc. 2d 575, 582, 276 N.Y.S.2d
249, 256-57 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967) (containing an extensive review of the cases).
In People v. System Properties Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 330, 34445, 141 N.E.2d 429, 435, 160 N.Y.S.2d 859, 868 (1957), speaking of the sovereign power over Lake George, the Court of Appeals wrote: "The reach of that power in trust for the People
is as great as the use and possibilities of the lake for navigation, as a water power reservoir and not excluding recreational uses." (emphasis added).
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/7
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"[T]itle to the bed of Canandaigua Lake is in the State of
New York in trust for all the people thereof." Granger v. City
of Canandaigua,257 N.Y. 126, 132, 177 N.E. 394, 396 (1931)
(a dispute over lake bed title).
"The proprietary interest of the riparian owner is
subordinate to the public easement of passage and the state
may be regarded as the trustee of a special public servitude."
Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. v. New York, 200 N.Y. 400,
418, 94 N.E. 199, 204 (1911) (emphasis added).
The right to grant the navigable waters is as absolute and
uncontrollable ... as its right to grant the dry land which
it owns. It holds all the public domain as absolute owner,
and is in no sense a trustee thereof, except as it is organized and possesses all its property, functions and powers
for the benefit of the people.
Langdon v. Mayor, 93 N.Y. 129, 156 (1883) (emphasis added).
While the state holds title to lands under navigable water
in a certain sense as a trustee for the public, it is competent for the supreme legislative power to authorize and
regulate grants of the same for public, or such other purposes as it may determine to be for the best interests of
the state.
Saunders v. New York C. & H. R.R., 144 N.Y. 75, 86, 38 N.E.
992, 994 (1894).
"The State, in place of the crown, holds the title, as trustee of a public trust, but the legislature may, as representative
of the people, grant the soil, or confer an exclusive privilege in
tidewaters or authorize a use inconsistent with the public
right." People v. New York & Staten Island Ferry Co., 68
N.Y. 71, 78 (1877) (emphasis added).
"The public rights of navigation are ... easements or servitudes which the State is bound and empowered to preserve
and protect as a trustee for its citizens." Commissioners of the
Canal Fund v. Kempshall, 26 Wend. 404, 420 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1841).
Other significant cases noting the public trust doctrine
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are:
Miller v. City of New York, 15 N.Y.2d 34, 203 N.E.2d
478, 255 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1964) (park property impressed with a
trust for the public cannot be alienated without express legislative sanction); Brooklyn Park Comm'n v. Armstrong, 45
N.Y. 234 (1871); Long Sault Dev. Co. v. Kennedy, 212 N.Y. 1,
10, 105 N.E. 849, 852 (1914), quoting the United States Supreme Court landmark on the public trust, Illinois Cent. R.R.
v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892); Coxe v. State, 144 N.Y.
396, 406, 39 N.E. 400, 402 (1895).
3.2. The General Rule of Streambed Ownership
in New York - is that "the bed of [a non-tidal stream] is
subject to private ownership, regardless of navigability." People v. System Properties,Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 330, 340, 141 N.E.2d
429, 432, 160 N.Y.S.2d 859, 864 (1957). The court in System
Propertiesmade its determination of whether the claimant indeed had private ownership of the bed of the Ticonderoga
River by examining the two possible roots of such a title, viz.:
(a) title received under a grant of the river bed, or
(b) title by adverse possession or prescription.
The court held that the claimant's grant excluded the bed of
the river, but the claimant had acquired title by adverse possession to at least a portion of the bed by maintaining a series
of dams on the riverbed over a period of 160 years.
3.2.1. Particular Holdings - Most of the New York
cases which have considered the ownership of the beds of specific freshwater (non-tidal) streams have found the ownership
to be held by the private riparian owners; a few have not,
though their principle has, as earlier noted, been limited to
the Hudson and Mohawk rivers.
3.2.1.1. Title to Beds of Freshwater Rivers Held
to be in Private Riparian Owners - In People v. Waite,
103 Misc. 2d 204, 206, 425 N.Y.S.2d 462, 463 (St. Law. County
Ct. 1979), a prosecution for trespass, it was said:
The bed of non-navigable streams, or other bodies of
water, is subject to private ownership and the title
thereto, as a general rule, is vested in the proprietors of
the adjoining uplands.

.
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York allows title to the bed of navigable waters which are
tideless... to be vested in the riparian owners. (emphasis
added).

In Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. v. New York, 200
N.Y. 401, 415-16, 94 N.E. 199, 203 (1911), the court
concluded:
[Tihe common law rule governs with respect to the character of the Oswego river and being, within its [ebb-andflow] definition, non-navigable in law, the state would not
hold title to its bed by virtue of its sovereignty and could
exercise no other right therein . .. except as such right
might relate to the improvement of the channel and bed
of the river for the purposes of navigation and commerce,
as one for the advantage of the public easement. [The
court described the ebb-and-flow test of streambed title
as one] which, by long standing, has acquired the stability
of a rule of property.

Id.
In Smith v. Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463, 479 (1883), the court
approvingly quoted an extensive footnote to Ex parte Jennings, 6 Cow. 517, 543 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826) to the effect that:
Rivers not navigable, that is fresh waters of what kind soever, do of common right belong to the owners of the soil
adjacent to the extent of their land length ....
That this
ownership of the citizen is of the whole river, viz. the soil
and the water of the river, except that in his river where
boats, rafts, etc. may be floated to market, the public
have a right of way or easement.
In Chenango Bridge Co. v. Paige, 83 N.Y. 178, 184 (1880),
the court wrote: "The Chenango River is a fresh water stream.
It is the private property of the riparian owners. The public,
in such streams, have an easement only for navigation and for
floating of logs and timber."
In Varick v. Smith, 9 Paige Ch. 547, 554-57 (N.Y. Ch.
1842) (Oswego), the Vice Chancellor wrote that, notwithstanding some contrary intimations in Canal Appraisers v. People
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ex rel. Tibbits, 17 Wend. 571 (N.Y. 1836), the ebb-and-flow
test of state ownership applies in New York, and the latter
case, in holding the bed of the Mohawk to be state owned, is
authority only for the Mohawk itself. See also Varick v.
Smith, 5 Paige Ch. 137 (N.Y. Ch. 1835) (Oswego).
In Luce v. Carley, 24 Wend. 450, 452-53 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1840) (Onondaga River), the court expressed concern that, if
grants of stream-side lands were not construed to include the
lands under water as well, "water gores would be multiplied
by the thousands along the inland streams, small and great."
"[N]othing is better settled than that grants of lands,
bounded upon rivers or streams where the tide does not ebb
or flow, carry the exclusive right of the grantee to the middle
of the stream unless . . . clearly and unequivocally [intended
to] not extend beyond the water's edge." Canal Appraisers v.
People ex rel. Tibbits, 13 Wend. 355, 371 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1835), rev'd, 17 Wend. 571, 612 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836). This
case was decided during the period when New York was still
wavering on these issues. See supra § 3.
But cf.: Commissioners of the Canal Fund v. Kempshall,
26 Wend. 404, 416-17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841), where it was argued that it was unnecessary to the holding in Tibbits 17
Wend. 571, 612 (N.Y. 1836), rev'g, 13 Wend. 355, 371 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1835), to reject the suitability of the ebb-and-flow
rule for New York, and it was declared that the rule in New
York was "still ... an open question": The court held that the
Genesee River is privately owned.
See also:
Meadvin v. State, 22 A.D.2d 326, 327, 255 N.Y.S.2d 357,
359 (4th Dept. 1965) (Onondaga Creek).
People ex rel. New York, 0. & W. Ry. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 116 Misc. 774, 778, 191 N.Y.S. 464, 466 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1921) (Susquehanna River).
3.2.1.2. Title to Beds of Freshwater Rivers Held
to be in State - A number of early judicial opinions stated
that the English common law view, regarding ownership of
non-tidal but navigable fresh rivers as private, was unsuited
to the conditions existing in New York. The application of the
English rule in New York was, on that ground, sometimes dehttps://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/7
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nied. However, the particular facts before the courts in those
cases that declared the state to be the owner of non-tidal riverbeds happened to arise in relation to only the Hudson and
Mohawk Rivers. Despite the broad language which those cases
used in rejecting the English rule, the Court of Appeals later
decided not to extend their precedential effect to other fresh
water streams.
In People ex rel. Loomis v. Canal Appraisers, 33 N.Y.
461 (1865), the Court of Appeals questioned the authenticity
of what is usually understood to be the English common law
of freshwater stream ownership (as expounded by Lord Hale's
famous treatise), stating that "much misapprehension has existed as to what doctrine he actually promulgated." Id. at 469.
An extensive analysis of the English cases was provided, with
the conclusion that, in England, "the flow and reflow of the
tide is [only] prima facie evidence . . . of the fact that the
river is navigable" for purposes of title, fishery rights, etc. Id.
at 469-72. The court likewise reviewed the early New York
lower court cases, observing at length that the previous holdings both embraced and rejected the view that fresh water,
navigable in fact, belongs to the private riparian owners. It
concluded its review of the contradictory authorities by selecting "as the settled law of the state" that "generally navigable"
freshwater streams belong to the state. See id. at 500, 479-81.
(This holding was later limited to the Mohawk River in Smith
v. Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463, 481-82 (1883). See introductory
paragraphs to this chapter, supra.)
See also:
Lehigh Valley R.R. v. Canal Board, 69 Misc. 251, 255, 125
N.Y.S. 227, 231 (1910): "[T]he fee of the bed of the [Seneca]
river, as of all navigable streams, is vested in the state, and
that [the private] plaintiff has no property rights therein."
aff'd on other grounds, 146 A.D. 151, 157-58, 130 N.Y.S. 978,
982 (4th Dept. 1911), aff'd, 204 N.Y. 471 (1912).
Roberts v. Baumgarten, 110 N.Y. 380, 383, 18 N.E. 96, 97
(1888), stating in dicta that the English ebb-and-flow rule of
navigability for ownership was "plainly inapplicable to our
large inland rivers and lakes," and citing Loomis, supra, with
approval.
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In Brown v. Scofield, 8 Barb. 239, 243 (Sup. Gen. T.
1850), an action for obstructing a public river (the Canisteo)
with a dam, it was said:
The common law of England upon this subject, from its
utter want of fitness and adaptation to the condition of
things here, in our extended territory, with its numerous
inland lakes and countless streams . . . has never been
adopted, or if adopted, it has been in a form modified and
improved to fit the condition of the country, and the
wants of its inhabitants.
The judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed, but the court did
not actually render a decision as to ownership of the bed of
the river.
Canal Appraisers v. People ex rel. Tibbits, 17 Wend. 571,
612-20 (N.Y. 1836) (rejected the suitability of the ebb-andflow test of "navigability" for New York). See § 3.4.3.
Canal Comm'n v. People ex rel. Tibbits, 5 Wend. 423,
460, 464 (N.Y. 1830), in which Beardsley, S. wrote:
Almost the whole current of legislation in this state in regard to navigable rivers is adverse to this principle [of
private ownership to the center of fresh water streams]...
. Had the common law originated on this continent we
should never have heard of the doctrine that fresh water
rivers are not navigable above the flow of the tide; nor
would our courts of justice have been called upon to compromise the interests of the community by sacrificing
truth to technicality and substance to form.
The court held that the claimant failed to show title to a waterfall in the Mohawk River.
In 1830 and 1850, the Legislature authorized the Commissioners of the Land Office to convey "lands under the waters
of navigable rivers or lakes." E.g., Laws 1850, ch. 280, p. 621.
See People ex rel. Loomis v. Canal Appraisers, 33 N.Y. 461,
466 (1865). Inasmuch as there are no navigable in law (i.e.,
tidal) lakes, these enactments make sense only if viewed as a
legislative recognition and assertion of state title over all lakes
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/7
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that are navigable in fact. There are, of course, "navigable in
law" rivers, but it would be very peculiar to use the word
"navigable" in these statutes to mean one thing in relation to
rivers and an altogether different thing in relation to lakes.
These statutes therefore also strongly imply a legislative recognition and assertion of state title over all rivers that are
navigable in fact. See id.; but cf. Varick v. Smith, 9 Paige Ch.
546, 556 (N.Y. Ch. 1842) ("The legislature then should be
deemed to use the term [navigable] in a legal sense when they
are applying it to create or describe a legal right.").
Cf.:
Moyer v. State of New York, 56 Misc. 2d 549, 551, 289
N.Y.S.2d 114, 116 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1968). In holding a bay off of
Lake Ontario to be property of the state, the court wrote:
"Regarding the title to these lands, there is a presumption
under the law that lands under navigable waters are the property of the State and the burden is upon the one claiming the
contrary." The court was referring to lands under Lake Ontario which is, of course, non-tidal.
Johnson v. State, 151 A.D. 361, 363-64, 135 N.Y.S. 496,
498 (3d Dept. 1912) (title to uplands excluded bed of creek,
where the original royal patent said "[e]xcepting Wood Creek
which is reserved as a common highway for the benefit of the
public." The later conveyance by the state of the same uplands, after forfeiture by royal patentee on the grounds of
treason, likewise excluded the creek bed.).
3.3. Exceptions: Hudson, Mohawk Rivers and
Boundary Waters 3.3.1. Beds of Hudson and Mohawk are Owned by
the State - The beds of the non-tidal portion of the Hudson and of the Mohawk River have been an exception to the
general rule in New York that the owner of riparian land on a
non-tidal navigable river owns to the center. The origins of
this special treatment were learnedly discussed at some length
in Finch, Pruyn & Co. v. State, 122 Misc. 404, 407-08, 203
N.Y.S. 165, 168-69 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1924) (Hudson at and above
Glens Falls is navigable in fact), where the court mentioned
three possibilities:
1. The original grants along these rivers were made by the
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Dutch and, therefore, were to be construed under the civil law
which did not convey the beds of streams.
2. The English common-law rule (the ebb-and-flow rule)
was unsuited to our country and, therefore, was not applied to
these rivers.
3. The size, location and commercial importance of these
rivers demanded that they be excluded from the usual rule, an
exclusion acquiesced in by all.
Whatever the explanation, the exception is fact.
In Danes v. State, 219 N.Y. 67, 72-74, 113 N.E. 786, 78788, (1916) (Mohawk), this exception was said to have
originated in the Dutch colonial practice of retaining the beds
of the Hudson and Mohawk when making grants to settlers.
Because New York State is now the sovereign successor to the
British and Dutch, the state now generally owns the beds of
these rivers.
In People ex rel. Loomis v. Canal Appraisers, 33 N.Y.
461, 499 (1865) (Mohawk), the court concluded that a conveyance of lands bounded by any actually navigable stream, including the Mohawk, would carry only to the bank and not
the center of the stream, rejecting the English common law
rule as unsuitable to conditions in New York. [This position
was later repudiated by the Court of Appeals, which limited
the Loomis holding to the Mohawk and Hudson Rivers (See
supra, introduction to this chapter and § 3.2.1.2.).]
The state's ownership of the bed of such navigable (in
law) streams extends up to the high water line. People v. Tibbetts, 19 N.Y. 523, 527 (1859) (Hudson at Troy; remanded for
further evidence as to tidal effects at Troy). Accord Stewart v.
Turney, 237 N.Y. 117, 125, 142 N.E. 437, 440 (1923) (dictum).
See also:
New York Power & Light Corp. v. State of New York,
230 A.D. 338, 342, 245 N.Y.S. 44, 49 (3d Dept. 1930) (Mohawk
is a public stream; title in state).
Accord People v. Page, 58 N.Y.S. 239, 241 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1897) (recognizing title to bed of Mohawk in state) rev'd in
part, 39 A.D. 110, 56 N.Y.S. 834 (3d Dept. 1899).
Canal Comm'n v. People ex rel. Tibbits, 5 Wend. 423,
460, 463 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1830); 13 Wend. 355 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/7
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1835), rev'd, 17 Wend. 571, 609 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841) ("not
only the colonial government but the state authorities have
considered the bed of the Mohawk as belonging to the public") (emphasis added).
3.3.2. Beds of Hudson and Mohawk Held not
Owned by the State - Although the beds of the Hudson
and Mohawk are mostly owned by the state, certain areas of
the beds passed to private ownership as a result of conveyances which were intended to include the bed. Williams v.
City of Utica, 217 N.Y. 162, 111 N.E. 468 (1916) (successful
ejectment action by successor to grantee of bed). "[T]he question [is] whether King George having title to the bed of the
stream did intend to and did convey the same .... ." Id. at
169, 111 N.E. at 470.
3.3.3. Boundary Waters - To the extent that "our
freshwater rivers and lakes formed territorial boundaries", the
English rule assigning streambed ownership to the private riparian owners is "clearly, inapplicable." Fulton Light, Heat &
Power Co. v. New York, 200 N.Y. 400, 413, 94 N.E. 199, 202
(1911).
"The title to the beds of boundary line streams, a jus
privatum, is in the State [sic] as sovereign in trust for the
people and so remains unless specifically granted." People v.
New York & Ontario Power Co., 219 A.D. 114, 116, 219 N.Y.S.
497, 500 (3d Dept. 1927) (St. Lawrence River).
See also:
Moyer v. State of New York, 56 Misc. 2d 549, 551, 289
N.Y.S.2d 114, 116 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1968) (bay off of Lake Ontario
is property of the state).
Hawkins v. State, 54 Misc. 2d 847, 853, 283 N.Y.S.2d 615,
621 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1967) (East Bay, a portion of Lake Ontario).
Niagara Falls Power Co. v. Water Power and Control
Comm'n, 267 N.Y. 265, 270, 196 N.E. 51, 53 (1935).
Long Sault Dev. Co. v. Kennedy, 212 N.Y. 1, 7, 105 N.E.
849, 851 (1914) (St. Lawrence River).
Gouverneur v. The National Ice Co., 134 N.Y. 355, 359,
31 N.E. 865, 867 (1892) (noting an exception for "our large
fresh water lakes or inland seas" and "those lakes and streams
which form the natural boundaries between us and foreign
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nations").
In Re Commn's of State Reservation, 37 Hun. 537, 547
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 5th Dept. 1885) (Niagara River).
Champlain & St. L. R.R. v. Valentine, 19 Barb. 484, 48992 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1853) (Lake Champlain).
Canal Appraisers v. People ex rel. Tibbits, 17 Wend. 571,
623 (N.Y. Ct. for the Correction of Errors 1836) (dictum).
3.4. Interpretation of Deeds - In general, grants
bounded by tidal waters carry only to the high water marks,
unless the language clearly indicates a different intent. Tiffany v. Town of Oyster Bay, 209 N.Y. 1, 9, 102 N.E. 585, 587
(1913); Sage v. Mayor, 154 N.Y. 61, 69-70, 47 N.E. 1096, 1098
(1897) (hence, the rule that lands under tidal waters are generally not deemed to have passed into private ownership). See
supra § 2.2. By contrast, grants bounded by non-tidal streams
are usually deemed to carry to the center of the stream. The
weight of more recent authority holds that deeds to lands
bounding all but the largest freshwater lakes and ponds carry
to the center of the lake or pond, unless otherwise expressed.
The main interpretive distinction made by the cases is
between grants that "touch" the water and grants which extend only to a point on dry land at the water margin. Only
those grants which "touch" the water are deemed to extend
under it and convey submerged lands as well.
3.4.1. Grant Framed so as to Touch the Water: Title to Center - "If the boundary touches the water or is
along the water or by the water, and not on dry land, the presumption remains that title is carried to the center of the
river or pond." White v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 254 N.Y. 152,
157, 172 N.E. 452, 454 (1930).
In Brant Lake Shores, Inc. v. Barton, 61 Misc. 2d 902,
905, 307 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1009-10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970), the
court wrote:
A description using the words 'low water mark', in the absence of an express reservation, carries title to the center
of the lake or pond ...[but since the grantor] conveyed
only to high water mark [the grantee] only acquired title
in said premises to high water mark, which precluded title
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In White v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 254 N.Y. 152, 156, 172
N.E. 452, 453 (1930), the court stated:
If the parties mean to exclude the land under water [of
small non-navigable lakes and ponds], they should do so
by express exception; the restriction ought to be framed
in very plain and express words ....

A description carry-

ing the boundary 'by the shore' is such an express restriction; likewise 'to the bank'. On the other hand, 'along said
pond,' . . . carried title to the center of the pond. [Cita-

tions omitted.] [In sum, a] description ... so framed as to
touch the water of the river or pond, carries title to the
center thereof.
Id. at 157, 172 N.E. at 454 (emphasis added). The court held
that the deed to shore lands of Rockland Lake included title
to the bed.
In Stewart v. Turney, 237 N.Y. 117, 121, 142 N.E. 437,
438-39 (1923), the court said of the rule that "the grantee
takes title to the center of the highway or to the thread of [a
non-tidal] stream or lake. A presumption founded originally
upon the assumed intent of the parties, it has now become a
rule of property." Still, however, the presumption may be
"negatived by express words" or a clear description excluding
the bed lands.
The rule of the common law of this state (enlarging or
extending that of England) that the title to the bed of
navigable rivers, not tidal, passed to the grantees of the
adjacent banks has not heretofore been applied to the
[royal] grants of the banks of the Hudson and Mohawk
rivers.
Danes v. State, 219 N.Y. 67, 71, 113 N.E. 786, 787 (1916).
However, in interpreting an English conveyance of lands
described as "lying and being . . . on both sides of the Mohawk river" (emphasis added) and then described more particularly by metes and bounds, the court in Williams v. City
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of Utica, 217 N.Y. 162, 170-71, 111 N.E. 468 (1916), held that
the conveyance was intended to include the bed of the river,
stating: "[T]his general location of the tract [by reference to
the river] ought not be construed as overruling definite and
exact boundary lines or as excluding land which was included
within those boundary lines." Id. at 470.
In Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. v. New York, 200
N.Y. 401, 416, 94 N.E. 199, 204 (1911), the court stated that,
presuming a consideration was paid, grants from the state
should not be construed "with any extraordinary strictness as
against the grantee." In considering the effect of a grant made
by the state, therefore, it applied the "old and well-settled
rule" that "where a grant has no other boundary on the river
side but the stream itself, . . . the legal presumption is that it
was intended to convey to the middle of the stream." The
grant from the state which the court had before it described
the boundary as running "to the said river and then up and
along the same." This language, the court held, conveyed a
tract of land "bounded ... by the center of the Oswego river."
By contrast, "a boundary line, which is described as 'along the
shore', or 'along the bank,' of a fresh-water stream would not
extend the grant to the center." Id. at 417, 94 N.E. at 204.
In Varick v. Smith, 9 Paige Ch. 546 (N.Y. Ch. 1842), in
passing on a map description contained in a deed from the
state, the Vice Chancellor noted that the lot conveyed was, on
the map, "laid down and delineated as lying adjacent and extending to the Oswego River." Accordingly, the Vice Chancellor wrote, it "must be taken as though the premises were described by words in the grant itself, as extending to, and
bounded on the river." Id. at 549. The court held that the
granted lands were deemed to include the bed of the river.
Luce v. Carley, 24 Wend. 450, 452-53 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1840) (Onondaga River: concern that, if grants of stream-side
lands were not construed to include the lands under water as
well, "water gores would be multiplied by the thousands along
the inland streams, small and great.").
See also:
Hartwood Syndicate, Inc. v. Passaic Valley Council, Boy
Scouts of America, 80 A.D.2d 871, 872, 457 N.Y.S.2d 16, 17
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(2d Dept. 1981) (Beaver Dam Pond/Reservoir in private
ownership).
Town of Guilderlandv. Swanson, 29 A.D.2d 717, 718, 286
N.Y.S.2d 425, 427 (3d Dept. 1968), aff'd, 24 N.Y.2d 872, 249
N.E.2d 467, 301 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1969).
Meadvin v. State, 22 A.D.2d 326, 327, 255 N.Y.S.2d 357,
359 (4th Dept. 1965) (Onondaga Creek).
Waters of White Lake, Inc. v. Fricke, 282 A.D. 333, 336,
123 N.Y.S.2d 400, 403 (3d Dept. 1953), aff'd, 308 N.Y. 899,
126 N.E.2d 568 (1955)
Seneca Nation of Indians v. Knight, 23 N.Y. 498 (1861)
(concern about "water gores").
Ledyard v. Ten Eyck, 36 Barb. 102, 125 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1862) (Cazenovia Lake).
Lowndes v. Dickerson, 34 Barb. 586, 592 (Sup. Gen. T.
1861) (dicta).
3.4.2. Grant Extending to a Point or Line on Dry
Land: Low Water Line -"[I]f the description runs the title along dry land, such as the bank or the shore, there is an
express restriction which excludes or reserves title in the river
or pond." (emphasis added). White v. Knickerbocker Ice Co.,
254 N.Y. 152, 157, 172 N.E. 452, 454 (1930). Accordingly, the
private ownership extends only to the low water line.
In Carlino v. Barton, 76 Misc. 2d 240, 242, 349 N.Y.S.2d
535, 539 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973), the court held that a deed
bounding land "along the shores" of a small, inland freshwater lake conveys title to the low water line.
In People v. System Properties,Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 330, 141
N.E.2d 429, 160 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1957), the court had before it
an English conveyance of lands "along the Banks" of the Ticonderoga River. In interpreting this conveyance, the court
observed:
[A]ccording to the English common law as of about 1764
the owner of land on each side of a non-tidal river . . .
owned to the center of the stream and if he owned land
on both sides he owned the whole river unless his grant
specifically and in terms excluded the bed .... [There
is] no real difference in this respect between the English
45

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6

and American colonial law and the modern law of New
York State.
Id. at 341, 141 N.E.2d at 433, 160 N.Y.S.2d at 865 (emphasis
added). However, the court concluded that "running the
boundary line along the bank of the stream [as in this case]
results in an exclusion of the land under water." Id. at 342,
141 N.E.2d at 433, 160 N.Y.S.2d at 865 (emphasis added).
Halsey v. McCormack, 13 N.Y. 296 (1855) (grant to
"bank" of a creek goes to the low water mark in order to secure use of the water to the riparian owner).
Accord Child v. Starr, 4 Hill 369, 376 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1842); Starr v. Child, 5 Denio 599, 602-03 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1846). ("A grant, therefore, which is bounded by the shore of
a freshwater river, conveys the land to the water's edge, at
low-water.")
See also:
Meadvin v. State, 22 A.D.2d 326, 328, 255 N.Y.S.2d 357,
360 (4th Dept. 1965) (Onondaga Creek).
Johnson v. State, 151 A.D. 361, 363, 135 N.Y.S. 496, 498
(3d Dept. 1912) (royal patent said "Excepting Wood Creek
which is reserved as a common highway for the benefit of the
public").
Geneva v. Henson, 195 N.Y. 447, 88 N.E. 1104 (1909),
aff'd, 140 A.D. 49, 124 N.Y.S. 588 (4th Dept. 1918).
3.4.3. Exceptional Cases - "The rule is well established that nothing passes in such grants [of lands on both
sides of the Hudson River] . .. by implication, or except such
as is expressed in unequivocal language .... ." West Virginia
Pulp & Paper Co. v. Peck, 189 A.D. 286, 293, 178 N.Y.S. 663,
668 (3d Dept. 1919), modified, 190 A.D. 891, 178 N.Y.S. 663
(1919). "The Queen Anne patent.., clearly did not have the
effect of conveying the bed of the river." Id. at 670, 178
N.Y.S.2d at 670.
In Wheeler v. Spinola, 54 N.Y. 377, 385 (1873), the court
wrote that "a boundary upon ... [a freshwater pond] does not
carry title to its center but only to the low-water mark. Such
is the rule as to boundaries upon natural ponds and lakes,"
noting that the rule applied to ordinary freshwater streams
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/7
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would not apply to a fresh water pond.
In People ex rel. Loomis v. Canal Appraisers, 33 N.Y.
461, 480, 500 (1865), the Court of Appeals paraphrased and
approved the earlier statement by Senator Beardsley in Canal
Appraisers v. People ex rel. Tibbits, 17 Wend. 571, 612 (N.Y.
Ch. 1836):
Where patents have been bounded upon navigable fresh
water rivers in this state, and nothing appears from the
grant that the state intended to part with the bed of the
river, the patentee shall not by an implied grant take the
river to the exclusion of the state, where the state wishes
to use it for public purposes.
Remember, however, that Loomis and its line of reasoning rejecting application of the English common law rule in New
York - was confined to the Hudson and Mohawk rivers in
Smith v. Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463, 481-82 (1883).
3.5. Private Title by Prescription or Adverse
Possession - may be acquired in state-owned lands. This
includes lands under non-tidal waters. The general rule is that
if title could be acquired to the particular lands by a grant
from the state, then title can be acquired by adverse possession (a "lost grant") as well. As already described in §§ 3.2
and 3.4, supra, the state not only can grant title to lands
under fresh waters, but there is a presumption that it does
make such grants whenever it conveys the adjoining uplands.
The question addressed in the cases below is distinct from the
question of whether the public right of passage could be extinguished by prescription or adverse possession. See infra §
4.6.
In Arnold's Inn, Inc. v. Morgan, 63 Misc. 2d 279, 285, 310
N.Y.S.2d 541, 548 (Sup. Ct. 1970), modified, 35 A.D.2d 987,
317 N.Y.S.2d 989 (2d Dept. 1970), the court said, in respect to
lands under the tidal waters of Manhasset Bay: "The land involved herein, however, is alienable [citations omitted] and
therefore, since the Town could divest itself of title by an express grant it could also lose title by prescription."
But cf. Hawkins v. State, 54 Misc. 2d 847, 853, 283
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N.Y.S.2d 615, 621 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1967) ("the State's sovereign
title [to the bed of Lake Ontario] is inalienable except by
grant").
In People v. System Properties,Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 330, 343,
141 N.E.2d 429, 434, 160 N.Y.S.2d 859, 866 (1957), the Court
of Appeals stated that, by maintenance of a dam on a stateowned streambed, title to the streambed could be acquired by
adverse possession because (1) "this dam standing on a rocky
ledge in the river is at a place where its existence ... interferes with no public use," and (2) the state itself had conveyed
other nearby portions of the same river.
Nevertheless, the court in System Properties wrote,
"[tihe rule appropriate to some situations is that a grant to a
private individual may not be presumed or adverse possession
adjudicated as to lands theretofore appropriated to a public
use by the state since such lands are inalienable (Burbank v.
Fay, 65 N.Y. 57, 66 (1875) et seq.)." Id. at 342-43, 141 N.E.2d
at 434, 160 N.Y.S.2d at 860.
In Burbank v. Fay, 65 N.Y. 57 (1875), the court wrote
that: "Where no express grant can be allowed, the law will not
resort to the fiction of an implied grant so as to create a prescriptive right .... ." Id. at 67. "The principles thus laid down
as to highways on the land, are plainly applicable to navigable
waters." Id. at 71. The court held that no prescriptive right to
canal waters, by analogy to natural streams existed.
See also:
Carlino v. Barton, 76 Misc. 2d 240, 243, 349 N.Y.S.2d 535,
540 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973), in which the court found title by
prescription to the area between the low and high water line
on a small, inland lake.
New York v. Wilson & Co., 278 N.Y. 86, 15 N.E.2d 408
(1938) (lands under margins of tidal waters were held to be
alienable).
Wheeler v. Spinola, 54 N.Y. 377, 387 (1873), in which the
court refused to find adverse possession of underwater lands
where the "land was never inclosed . . . never cultivated and
never possessed except ... temporary occupancy for such an
unimportant purpose [cutting thatch once a year], really
nothing but trespasses repeated from year to year."
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/7
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3.6. Title to Lake Beds - The ownership of lakebeds,
like title to streambeds, depends fundamentally on the history
of conveyances from the root of title down to the present. In
litigated cases, lake bed title is generally found to be held by
the private riparian owners, except in the case of large lakes,
where title has generally been adjudicated to be in the state.
In Granger v. City of Canandaigua, 257 N.Y. 126, 177
N.E. 394 (1931), a dispute over lake bed title, the court said:
The title to the bed of large lakes [George, Seneca, Cayuga, Oneida] remains in the state; of the small lakes in
private ownership. Between the two groups come lakes
like Onondaga, Otsego and Canandaigua. Where shall we
place them? ...Except as applied to comparatively small

and narrow bodies of water, resembling rivers, rather than
lakes, it seems ... contrary to our institutions to say that

fresh water lakes are the subject of private ownership.
Id. at 130-31, 77 N.E. at 396.
The court characterized its decision in Granger as a
"practical construction" of the original conveyance of the alleged private title to the lake bed, viz. a 1786 grant from New
York to Massachusetts known as the "Treaty of Hartford."
Id. The court held that "title to the bed of Canandaigua Lake
is in the State of New York in trust for all the people." Id. at
132, 77 N.E. at 296. (The plaintiffs had sued to restrain the
city from entering upon and filling the lake bed in violation of
their alleged private title rights.)
In White v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 254 N.Y. 152, 156-57,
172 N.E. 452 (1930), the court held that a deed to shore lands
of Rockland Lake included title to the bed. "If the parties
mean to exclude the land under water [of small non-navigable
lakes and ponds], they should do so by express exception." Id.
at 156, 172 N.E. at 453. " [A] description ...

so framed as to

touch the water of the river or pond, carries title to the center
thereof." Id. at 156, 172 N.E. at 454 (emphasis added).
In Stewart v. Turney, 237 N.Y. 117, 142 N.E. 437 (1923),
the court wrote: "Were it necessary we would hold, however,
that with regard to a grant of land on Cayuga lake an exception should be made to the common-law rule [presumptively
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extending riparian ownership to the center of a lake] ..... Id.
at 123, 142 N.E. at 439. "[W]e hold that under a grant from
the state the grantee took to the low-water mark on Lake Cayuga." Id. at 130, 142 N.E. at 442. See also New York State
Water Resources Comm'n v. Liberman, 37 A.D.2d 484, 488,
326 N.Y.S.2d 284, 288 (3d Dept. 1971) (The bed of Cayuga
Lake "is held by the State in its sovereign capacity in trust for
the people of the state.").
In Gouverneur v. National Ice Co., 134 N.Y. 355, 359, 31
N.E. 865, 867 (1892), it was said: "Natural ponds and small
lakes are private property. They pass by grant of land in
which they are included." The court held that the riparian
owners of Croton Pond (about 45 acres) own to the center of
the pond.
In People ex rel. Burnham v. Jones, 112 N.Y. 597, 606, 20
N.E. 577, 579 (1889), the court wrote: "[I]t is conceded by
both parties that [private ownership] extends only to the
high-water mark on inland seas or large navigable bodies of
water like those of Lake Ontario [citation omitted] and that
the title to all lands beyond high-water mark or under water
is in the state."
In Smith v. Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463 (1883), an action to
restrain the diversion of waters, the court stated in its discussion that the "property to the soil under the waters of Hemlock Lake [7 miles long x 1/2mile wide] were acquired by and
belong to the riparian owners" by virtue of the grant, known
as the Treaty of Hartford, from New York to Massachusetts
in 1786. Id. at 476.
Although the court (1) "stated in passing" that the English rule as to freshwater titles is "inapplicable to the vast
freshwater lakes or inland seas of this country or the streams
forming the boundary line of states," Id. at 479, and (2) "affirmed" that the term navigable water "has by common consent a more enlarged signification in this country and is here
held to mean all such waters as are actually navigable,
whether fresh or salt," Id. at 479-80, it nevertheless concluded
that "the decided preponderance of judicial authority in the
State favors the application of the [English] common-law rule
to the navigable waters of this State." Id. at 481. The court
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limited the Loomis case to its facts (i.e., the Mohawk), see
supra, § 3.2.1.2. , and the bed of Hemlock Lake was declared
to belong to its riparian owners. Id. at 482.
In Crooked Lake Nay. Co. v. Keuka Nay. Co., 4 N.Y. St.
Rep. 380, 383 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1887) (Keuka Lake navigable),
the court wrote: "The rule is that riparian owners of lands adjoining fresh water, non-navigable and navigable streams, and
small lakes, within the state, take title to the land underneath
the water abutting upon their premises."
In Brant Lake Shores, Inc. v. Barton, 61 Misc. 2d 902,
904-05, 307 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1009-10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970), the
court wrote: "[A] conveyance bounded by a small inland lake
or pond carries title to the center or thread of the current unless there is expression to the contrary." If, however, the grantor "conveyed only to high water mark ... [the grantee] only
acquired title in said premises to high water mark, which precluded title in and to any land beyond high water mark."
In Hawkins v. State, 54 Misc. 2d 847, 852-53, 283
N.Y.S.2d 615, 621 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1967), the court stated that to
prove title to a portion of a bay off Lake Ontario, the claimant
must show that "the State had relinquished, alienated or
transferred its ownership by express grant ... the State's sovereign title is inalienable except by grant." (emphasis added)
In Ledyard v. Ten Eyck, 36 Barb. 102 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1862), the bed of Cazenovia Lake was held to be the property
of the abutting riparians.
But cf. Wheeler v. Spinola, 54 N.Y. 377, 385 (1873), in
which the court stated that the rule applied to ordinary freshwater streams would not apply to a freshwater pond, stating:
"A boundary upon [a freshwater pond] does not carry title to
its center but only to the low-water mark. Such is the rule as
to boundaries upon natural ponds and lakes." [Later called
obiter dictum in Gouverneur v. National Ice Co., 134 N.Y.
355, 361, 31 N.E. 865, 867 (1892).]
See also Canal Comm'rs v. People ex rel. Tibbits, 5
Wend. 423, 447 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1830), which provided the following extended discussion:
The principle [that private title presumptively goes to the
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center of freshwater bodies] itself does not appear to be
sufficiently broad to embrace our large fresh water lakes,
or inland seas, which are wholly unprovided for by the
common law of England ....(emphasis in original) [O]ur
own local law appears to have assigned the shores down
to the ordinary low water mark to the riparian owners,
and the beds of the lakes with the islands therein to the
public.
(emphasis added). [Note: This quoted language was denominated "purely dictum," but followed, in Stewart v. Turney,
237 N.Y. 117, 123, 142 N.E. 437, 439, (1923).] The issue in
Tibbits was title to a waterfall in the Mohawk River.
In 1815, the Legislature authorized the Commissioners of
the Land Office to convey "lands under water on navigable
lakes." 1815 N.Y. Laws CXCIX. See People ex rel. Loomis v.
Canal Appraisers, 33 N.Y. 461, 466 (1865); Since there are no
lakes that are "navigable in law" (i.e., tidal), this enactment
makes sense only if viewed as a legislative recognition and assertion of state title over all lakes that are navigable in fact.
Other Cases and Authorities are:
Hartwood Syndicate, Inc. v. Passaic Valley Council, Boy
Scouts, 80 A.D.2d 871, 872, 437 N.Y.S.2d 16, 17 (2d Dept.
1981) (Beaver Dam Pond/Reservoir in private ownership).
Allen v. Potter, 64 Misc. 2d 938, 938-39, 316 N.Y.S.2d
790, 792 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970), aff'd, 37 A.D.2d 691, 323
N.Y.S.2d 409 (4th Dept. 1971) (title on Canandaigua Lake extends to low water line).
Town of Guilderland v. Swanson, 29 A.D.2d 717, 718, 286
N.Y.S.2d 425, 426-27 (3d Dept. 1968), aff'd, 24 N.Y.2d 872,
249 N.E.2d 467, 301 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1969) (recognizing rules of
construction applicable to streams (see supra § 3.4) as applicable to lakes).
Knight v. Ciarlone, 200 N.Y.S.2d 805 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1959) (title to lands on Lake George extend to low water line).
Waters of White Lake v. Fricke, 282 A.D. 333, 336, 123
N.Y.S.2d 400, 402-03, (3d Dept. 1953), aff'd, 308 N.Y. 899, 126
N.E.2d 568 (recognizing rule "a conveyance of land bounded
by a small inland lake or pond usually carries title to the
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center or the thread of the current unless there is expression
to the contrary.").
Ransom v. Shaeffer, 153 Misc. 199, 274 N.Y.S. 570 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1934), modified, 243 A.D. 858, 279 N.Y.S. 720 (4th
Dept. 1935) (title to lands on Lake Ontario extends to low
water line).
Shandalee Camp, Inc. v. Rosenthal, 133 Misc. 502, 505,
233 N.Y.S. 11, 14-15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1929) (Shandelee Lake,
4000 feet long and 1,200 feet wide is of a sort that is "subject
to private ownership").
Moore v. Day, 199 A.D. 76, 191 N.Y.S. 731 (1921), aff'd,
235 N.Y. 554, 139 N.E. 732 (1923) (bed of Lake Champlain is
owned by state).
Champlain & St. L. R.R. v. Valentine, 19 Barb 484, 48992 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1853) (grant of lands bounded by Lake
Champlain extends to the low water line).
See also:
4 Op. N.Y. Comp. 412 (1948) (each case depends on its
particular facts).
Colson, Title to Beds of Lakes in New York, 9 Cornell
L.Q. 159, 288 (1924).
Andrews, Lands Under Water in New York, 16 Cornell
L.Q. 277 (1931).
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Chapter IV.
THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT OF PASSAGE ON
STREAMS
4. The Public's Right of Passage on Streams While ownership of the beds of non-tidal streams is usually
deemed to be in the private riparian owners, the private ownership is subject to a public right of passage if the stream is
generally usable for such purpose. This "servitude of the public interest" has been consistently recognized from the earliest
days of New York navigation law. Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai.
R. 307, 319 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). "The Hudson at Stillwater,"
wrote Chancellor Kent in his seminal dictum, "is capable of
being held and enjoyed as private property, but it is, notwithstanding, to be deemed a public highway for public uses.... "
Id. (emphasis added). In other words, as the Court of Appeals
later reaffirmed: "The right of property in the soil or bed of a
navigable river or arm of the sea, and the right to use the waters for the purposes of navigation, are entirely separate and
distinct." People v. Vanderbilt, 26 N.Y. 287, 292 (1863) (emphasis added).
4.1. The English Common Law - held that "title to
the soil of the sea, or of the arms of the sea, or of tidal rivers,
was in the crown, subject to an easement in favor of the public
for passage, or transportation; while fresh water rivers belonged to the owners of their banks, also, subject to the use of
the public as navigable highways." Fulton Light, Heat &
Power Co. v. New York, 200 N.Y. 401, 412, 94 N.E. 199, 202
(1911) (emphasis added). Whether title to the bed was in the
crown or in the private riparian owners, there was never any
"distinction against the public right of passage and transportation." Id.
Thus, "[w]hether salt, or fresh, water streams, if they
were large enough to be capable of common passage and thus,
in fact, were navigable, they were regarded as common highways, which might not be impeded .... A stream to be exclusively owned by the riparian owner, must be too small to be
navigable in fact." Id. (emphasis added).
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4.2. The Public Right of Passage on New York
Streams - is deeply rooted. It is rare in New York to find a
judicial statement that stream beds can be privately owned
without the further statement, immediately appended, that
the private ownership is subject to the public right of passage.
4.2.1. Cases Affirming the Public Right of Passage on Streams - typically refer to the public right as an
"easement" or "right of way" for "travel" or "passage" as on a
"highway".
"A public right on a stream is a right of travel as on a
public highway." People ex rel. New York Cent. R.R. v. State
Tax Comm'n, 258 A.D. 356, 361, 16 N.Y.S.2d 812, 817 (3d
Dept. 1940), aff'd, 284 N.Y. 616, 29 N.E.2d 932 (1940) (Iona
Bay, Doodletown Creek and Popolopen Creek are navigable in
fact).
"A public right on a stream is the right of travel as on a
public highway." People ex rel. New York, 0. & W. Ry. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 116 Misc. 774, 775, 191 N.Y.S. 464, 466
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1921) (Susquehanna River).
The proprietary interest of the riparian owner is
subordinate the public easement of passage and the state
may be regarded as a trustee of a special public servitude
...[T]he legislature may direct the performance of acts
by state officers, which tend to promote the public right
of passage and transportation, without subjecting the
state to liability.
Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. v. New York, 200 N.Y. 400,
418, 94 N.E. 199, 204 (1911).
"The public has an easement in such waters for the purposes of travel as upon a public highway. . .

."

Crooked Lake

Nay. Co. v. Keuka Nay. Co., 4 N.Y. St. Rep. 380, 383 (5th
Dept. 1887), aff'd, 22 N.E. 1126 (1889) (Keuka Lake navigable
by small vessels).
"The common right of navigation in navigable rivers of
the State [sic] is in the people, and the equality of their right
to use them for that purpose cannot be abridged except by...
the legislature." In Re Comm'rs of State Reservation, 37 Hun.
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537, 550 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1885).
"[T]he rights and interests of the public, such as fishing,
ferrying and transportation, are preserved in all navigable waters by the inherent and inalienable attributes of the sovereign . . . ." Smith v. City of Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463, 480
(1883).
"[T]his ownership of the citizen is of the whole river, viz.
the soil and the water of the river, except that in his river
where boats, rafts, etc. may be floated to market, the public
have a right of way or easement." Smith v. Rochester, 92 N.Y.
463, 479 (1883) (approvingly quoting Judge Cowen's footnote
in Ex parte Jennings, 6 Cow. 518, 543 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826)).
As early as the year 1802, an act was passed declaring the
waters of certain streams, therein mentioned, to be public
highways ....
Numerous acts of a similar character are
found in our statute books, containing restrictions upon
the use of streams declared to be public highways, and of
the waters thereof.
People ex rel. Loomis v. Canal Appraisers, 33 N.Y. 461, 467
(1865).
"[T]he doctrine of riparian ownership does not give a
right to the bed of the stream, and the use of the water incompatible with the superior rights of the public, for the purposes of navigation and commerce." Varick v. Smith, 9 Paige
Ch. 547, 552 (N.Y. Ch. 1842).
The private "right of property [in submerged lands] is in
all respects analogous to the property in fee of any land subject to a public or private right of way, or any similar easement." Commissioners v. Kempshall, 26 Wend. 404, 413 (N.Y.
1841).
"The public right is one of passage . . . as in a common
highway. It is called by the cases an easement." Ex parte Jennings, 6 Cow. 518, 527-28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826).
"Individuals who occupy the adjoining banks may use the
waters for their own emolument, so far only as it can be done
without any material interruption of the public use." Shaw v.
Crawford, 10 Johns. 236, 238 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813).
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See also:
"Regardless of who owns legal title to the underlying
land, a navigable waterway is a form of public highway."
Town of Hempstead v. Oceanside Small Craft Marina Inc.,
64 Misc. 2d 4, 6, 311 N.Y.S.2d 668, 671 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970),
rev'd on other grounds, 38 A.D.2d 263, 328 N.Y.S.2d 894 (2d
Dept. 1972), aff'd, 32 N.Y.2d 859 (1973).
Lehigh Valley R.R. v. Canal Bd., 146 A.D. 151, 159, 130
N.Y.S. 978, 983 (4th Dept. 1911), modified, 204 N.Y. 471, 97
N.E. 964 (1912).
4.2.2. The Exceptional Lake Cases - There are several cases which appear to limit boating on small lakes to the
owners of the lake bottom, each being entitled to use only the
surface area above the portion of lake bottom actually owned.
It appears to be assumed in these cases that the lakes in question are non-navigable, even though they may be usable by
small boats. Perhaps significantly, the lakes in question do not
appear to have been ones which connect with other waterways
and, being more or less surrounded by private land, they
would not permit a boater to "navigate" from or to any place
in particular; they are, in that sense, entirely different from
"navigable" streams. See Fairchild v. Kraemer, 11 A.D.2d
232, 235, 204 N.Y.S.2d 823, 826 (2d Dept. 1960) ("consideration may be given to the existence or absence of termini at
and from which the public may enter and leave said
waterway").
Apart from the distinction based on an absence of termini, the exceptional lake cases appear to be irreconcilable
with the general common-law principles, which they neither
cite nor attempt to distinguish. The cases are: Mix v. Tice,
164 Misc. 261, 267, 298 N.Y.S. 441, 448 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1937);
Shandalee Camp, Inc. v. Rosenthal, 133 Misc. 502, 233 N.Y.S.
11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1929); Calkins v. Hart, 219 N.Y. 145, 113
N.E. 785 (1916) (trespass to take ice over riparian neighbor's
portion of lake); Commonwealth Water Co. v. Brunner, 175
A.D. 153, 161 N.Y.S. 794 (2d Dept. 1916); and Tripp v.
Richter, 158 A.D. 136, 139, 142 N.Y.S. 563, 565 (3d Dept.
1913). See contra, Smith v. Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463, 479-80
(1883) (dictum); Crooked Lake Nay. Co. v. Keuka Nay. Co., 4
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N.Y. St. Rep. 380, 383 (5th Dept. 1887), aff'd, 22 N.E. 1126
(1889) ("The public has an easement in such waters for the
purposes of travel as upon a public highway ...."); See also,
Waters of White Lake, Inc. v. Fricke, 282 A.D. 333, 123
N.Y.S.2d 400 (3d Dept. 1953), aff'd, 308 N.Y. 899, 126 N.E.2d
568 (1955); and Ten Eyck v. Town of Warwick, 75 Hun. 562,
567 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1894) (stating, in effect, that Greenwood
Lake "is in no legal or just sense of the term navigable
water").
4.3. Private Lands Which Are Subject to Public
Right of Passage - are those which are passed over by
streams or other waters that are "navigable in fact". The cases
do not define any particular outer limit (such as the high
water mark) to which the easement for public passage extends, though it appears to apply at least to those lands
within the lines of high water.
4.3.1. The Requirement of "Navigability in Fact"
- In order for a waterbody to be subject to the public's right
of passage, it must be "navigable in fact". See supra § 2.3.
"The distinguishing test between those rivers which are entirely private property, and those which are private property
subject to the public use and enjoyment, consists in the fact,
whether they are susceptible, or not, of use as common passage for the public." People v. Platt, 17 Johns. 195, 211 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1819).
A person's "right to navigate and anchor his boat in [an
artificially dredged] basin depends upon whether, prior to the
aforesaid dredgings, the creek which traversed the area was
navigable in fact . . . ." Fairchild v. Kraemer, 11 A.D.2d 232,
235, 204 N.Y.S.2d 823, 825 (2d Dept. 1960) (action by the bedowner for trespass).
"The servitude of privately owned lands forming the
banks and bed of a stream to the interest of navigation is a
natural servitude confined, to such streams as in their ordinary and natural condition are navigable in fact." People ex
rel. New York, 0. & W. Ry. v. State Tax Comm'n, 116 Misc.
774, 775, 191 N.Y.S. 464, 466 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1921) (emphasis
added) (Susquehanna River). However, the court later added:
"The capacity to float logs, singly or together, to run rafts
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/7
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however small, gives to all the public this easement .... " Id.
at 776, 191 N.Y.S. at 467.
"A stream, to be exclusively owned by the riparian owner,
must be too small to be navigable, in fact." Fulton Light,
Heat & Power Co. v. New York, 200 N.Y. 400, 412, 94 N.E.
199, 202 (1911).
"[R]ivers of sufficient magnitude and capacity for navigation are public highways, and... [the rights of private owners
are] subject to the easement of the public, which they cannot
lawfully interrupt." In Re Comm'r of State Reservation, 37
Hun. 537, 545 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1885).
"[W]here boats, rafts, etc. may be floated to market, the
public have a right of way or easement." Smith v. Rochester,
92 N.Y. 463, 479 (1883) (quoting with approval Judge Cowen's
footnote in Ex parte Jennings, 6 Cow. 518, 543 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1826)).
In Morgan v. King, 35 N.Y. 454 (1866), it was held that
stream users would have no action against another riparian
owner for obstructing a stream which, without artificial improvements, was incapable of transporting, in a condition fit
for market, the products of the forest, mines, or agriculture
along its banks because the stream was not, in its natural
state, a public highway.
See also Brant Lake Shores, Inc. v. Barton, 61 Misc. 2d
902, 907, 307 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970), which
considered the effect of a legislative declaration that certain
stream and lake waters are "public highways for the purpose
of floating logs, timber and lumber down those streams . ..."
The court said: "nor does ... [the enactment] give anyone a
greater right to use the waters of Brant Lake than one had
prior to such designation." Id.
4.3.2. Physical Extent of the Public Right - Private ownership on tidal waters generally runs only to the high
water line and, correspondingly, the public right of passage
and use likewise runs from the tidal waterbody itself to the
high water line. E.g., Tucci v. Salzhauer, 40 A.D.2d 712, 713,
336 N.Y.S.2d 721, 723 (2d Dept. 1972), aff'd, 33 N.Y.2d 854,
307 N.E.2d 256, 352 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1973); In re City of New
York, 216 N.Y. 67, 110 N.E. 176 (1915). The high water line
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plays no similar key role in demarcating the usual ownership
boundaries on non-tidal waters. See supra, § 3.2. The New
York courts have, however, generally recognized that the easement for public passage covers at least those lands within the
lines of high water.
In Trustees of Freeholdersand Commonalty of the Town
of Southampton v. Heilner, 84 Misc. 2d 318, 329, 375
N.Y.S.2d 761, 771 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975), the court concluded
that, because Shinnecock Bay was non-tidal when the riparian
owners took title, they acquired ownership to the low water
mark, but that such ownership was "subject to a right of the
public for navigation and connected uses up to the present
high-water mark."
In Bacorn v. State, 20 Misc. 2d 369, 373-374, 195
N.Y.S.2d 214, 219-20 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1959), the court rejected a
claim of compensation for lands at the margin of the navigable Chemung River. The state had appropriated the lands for
use in a flood control project. Referring to the stream-side
lands as part of the "bed", and therefore subject to the public
right, the court said: "The fact that there was sometimes no
water over this particular area does not establish that it does
not constitute a part of the bed of the Chemung River." It
concluded that "whether claimants . . . owned title under the
bed of the stream is immaterial" because, title or no, the
state's use of the lands would be "a proper exercise of the
State's [sic] power over public waters" for which no compensation would be required. Id.
In People ex rel. New York, 0. & W. Ry. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 116 Misc. 774, 775, 191 N.Y.S. 464, 466 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1921) (Susquehanna River), the court spoke of "[t]he servitude of privately owned lands forming the banks and bed of
a stream to the interest of navigation .. . ." (emphasis added).
In Champlain & St. L. R.R. v. Valentine, 19 Barb. 484,
492 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1853), the court held that ownership
bounded by Lake Champlain runs to the low water line, but if
a building below the high water line "is an obstruction or annoyance to the common passage by the public and to navigation, it may be a public nuisance."
But cf.:
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/7
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People v. Waite, 103 Misc. 2d 204, 206, 425 N.Y.S.2d 462,
463 (St. Law. County Ct. 1979). On the question of possible
trespass by a boater who tied the boat to some brush, the
court wrote that there was "insufficient evidence . . . as regards the location of the brush and whether it was growing
from the bank of the river or situate within the stream." But
the court added dicta suggesting that trespass might be possible "if the boat is tied to the shore or anchored." Id. at 207,
425 N.Y.S.2d at 464. No trespass was found on the facts
before the court.
Stewart v. Turney, 237 N.Y. 117, 130, 142 N.E. 437, 442
(1923), in which the court demurred. After assuming that title
on Cayuga Lake extends to the low water mark, the court
wrote, "[w]hether in high water the public has not the right of
navigation wherever a boat may float we do not decide." The
court held that the defendants, who entered the beach area
for the purpose of hunting, were trespassers. Id. at 131, 142
N.E. at 442.
In its analysis, the court in Stewart v. Turney, considered
also what "bank" would mean when applied to a river. It
quoted with apparent approval from an Iowa case which defined the "high-water mark" of the Mississippi River, noting
that a river bank means "the portion of earth which confines
the river in its channel ....
They are impressed upon the
earth itself by the attrition of the river current. Certainly
what the river does not occupy long enough to wrest from vegetation is not river bed. All this is clearly true." Id. at 127, 142
N.E. at 441.
4.4. Recreational Use Under the Public Right of
Passage - Although commercial usefulness is frequently
given as both a rationale and a criterion for the public right of
passage, no case found has ever held that the public's common-law right of use is limited to commercial passage. On the
contrary, the cases frequently describe the public's right of
use in such generic terms as "travel", "passage", or "transportation". See supra § 4.2.1. Similarly, streams navigable in fact
are typically referred to as "highways" for public use, undistinguished, except as to mode of transport, from public highways on dry land. See City of Albany v. State, 71 Misc. 2d
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294, 296-98, 335 N.Y.S.2d 975, 978 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1972) (Interstate Highway use is not a use "substantially different" from
public waterway use).
The notion that the public right is somehow inferentially
limited to commercial use is contrary, moreover, to an express
basic assumption which underlies the New York rule that allows private ownership of streams in the first place, viz. that,
irrespective of whether ownership is public or private, the law
makes "no distinction against the public right of passage and
transportation." Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. v. New
York, 200 N.Y. 400, 412, 94 N.E.199, 202 (1911). Permitting
bed-owners to prohibit recreational use would create a major
practical difference between public and privately owned waterways - inasmuch as state owned waters are clearly available for recreational use. See Grangerv. City of Canandaigua,
257 N.Y. 126, 131, 177 N.E. 394, 396 (1931); Tucci v.
Salzhauer, 40 A.D.2d 712, 713, 336 N.Y.S.2d 721, 723-24 (2d
Dept. 1972), aff'd, 33 N.Y.2d 854, 307 N.E.2d 256, 352
N.Y.S.2d 198 (1973). This difference would also run counter to
the postulate, made from the very first cases, that stream
ownership can be private "without any public inconvenience."
Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai. R. 307, 319-20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805)
because "the rights and interests of the public, such as fishing, ferrying and transportation, are preserved . . . ." Smith v.
City of Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463, 480 (1883) (emphasis added).
There is no neat division between commercial and recreational use. See e.g., Sawczyk v. United States Coast Guard,
499 F. Supp. 1034, 1039 (W.D.N.Y. 1980), where the court
found the Falls-to-Lewiston reach of the Niagara River to be
navigable in fact [and thus subject to United States admiralty
jurisdiction] based in part on commercial use in the form of
regularly operated raft trips (apparently recreational), stating
that "the raft venture at issue in these cases evidences the
continuing effort to exploit the river commercially."
Several cases provide clear affirmative indications that
recreational use is included:
In People v. Waite, 103 Misc. 2d 204, 425 N.Y.S.2d 462
(St. Law. County Ct. 1979), a prosecution for trespass, the
conviction was reversed on the grounds, merely, that the
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/7
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stream in question was navigable, notwithstanding that the
defendant's presence on the stream was apparently for a recreational purpose (non-commercial fishing).
In Fairchild v. Kraemer, 11 A.D.2d 232, 235, 204
N.Y.S.2d 823, 825 (2d Dept. 1960), an action by the bedowner for trespass, the court stated that the "defendant's
right to [use] . . . the basin depends upon whether . . . the
creek was navigable .... ." It also stated that: "The fact that a
stream has been used for pleasure boating may be considered
on the subject of the stream's capacity and the use of which it
is susceptible." Id. at 235, 204 N.Y.S.2d at 826. It appears
from a companion case that the defendant's purpose was recreational. See People v. Kraemer, 7 Misc. 2d 373, 377, 164
N.Y.S.2d 423, 427 (Police Ct. Suff. County 1957), aff'd, 6
N.Y.2d 363, 160 N.E.2d 633, 189 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1959).
In People ex rel. New York Cent. R.R. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 258 A.D. 356, 360. 16 N.Y.S.2d 812, 817 (3d Dept.
1940), aff'd, 284 N.Y. 616, 29 N.E.2d 932 (1940), the court, in
holding certain waters to be navigable in fact, noted as a relevant factor "that the creek and bay had both been actually
navigable commercially and for pleasure and that they still
retain their capacity for use." (emphasis added).
See Tucci v. Salzhauer, 40 A.D.2d 712, 713, 336 N.Y.S.2d
721, 723-24 (2d Dept. 1972), aff'd, 33 N.Y.2d 854, 307 N.E.2d
256, 352 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1973), which held that the jus publicum includes "use [of] the water covering the foreshore for
boating, bathing, fishing and other lawful purposes; and when
the tide is out ... as a means of access to reach the water for
the same purposes and to lounge and recline thereon," the latter being "consistent with and necessary for the complete and
innocent enjoyment of (the] right of access to the waters ... "
(emphasis. added). (It should be noted, however, that the
lands thus subjected to the jus publicum were a tidal foreshore still in government ownership. Cf. United States v.
Kane, 602 F.2d 490, 493 (2d Cir. 1979), observing that the jus
publicum may be limited by a conveyance of the land into
private ownership.)

Cf.:
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ton v. Heilner, 84 Misc. 2d 318, 328, 375 N.Y.S.2d 761, 770
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975), in which the court cited use by pleasure
craft as the primary evidence of navigability in fact, stating,
"[I]n today's life it cannot be said that this use is less important to society than commercial uses such as logging or transporting produce across the water."
People v. System Properties,Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 330, 344-45,
141 N.E.2d 429, 435, 160 N.Y.S.2d 859, 867-68 (1957), in
which the court referred to the reach of the state's power over
Lake George held in trust for the people as being "as great as
the uses and possibilities of the lake for navigation, as a waterpower reservoir and not excluding recreational uses."
But cf.:
Brant Lake Shores, Inc. v. Barton, 61 Misc. 2d 902, 907,
307 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970), where title was
the issue. The court wrote of Brant Lake: "As a public highway, anyone could use it for generally accepted highway purposes over water, such as floating logs and timber, but this
does not include the right to boat, bathe and swim." Despite
the breadth of this dicta, the court apparently did not intend
a statement of the general common law rule (for which no authorities were cited), but rather only an interpretation of the
particular statute which it had before it. The statute in question had declared the lake and other waters to be "public
highways for the purpose of floating logs, timber and lumber."
Id. The court also noted that "however a public highway
comes into existence, when once established there is no limitation of its use to certain individuals .... ." Id.
Granger v. City of Canandaigua,257 N.Y. 126, 177 N.E.
394 (1931), involved a dispute over lake bed title. The court
said that to hold that the state "had dedicated the bed of
[Canandaigua Lake] to private uses, subject to the rights of
navigation only, would be not only to deprive the public of
access to the water for recreation and enjoyment but also to
deprive the riparian owners of their customary privileges." Id.
at 131, 177 N.E. at 396 (emphasis added). While this obiter
dictum suggests that "navigation" might be something different from "recreation and enjoyment", recreational boating
was not the topic of discussion at all. Rather, it was solely
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/7
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non-boating recreational use of the disputed lands, "filling
them for park purposes," that was at issue in the case. Id. at
128, 177 N.E. at 395. The quoted language is, therefore, at
most a very weak and ambiguous authority for the proposition
that recreational boating does not count as "navigation".
Smith v. Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463, 483 (1883), in which the
court said that "the sovereign right grew out of and was based
upon the public benefits in promoting trade and commerce,
supposed to be derived from keeping open navigable bodies of
water as public highways for the common use of the people."
(emphasis added). Although it added that the public navigation easements would be "limited to the very purpose for
which they were created," it made no suggestion that the
easement was therefore limited to commercial travel as opposed to non-commercial travel. Id. at 484. More likely, the
court meant only to support its holding in the case, viz. the
state cannot, under guise of the navigation easement, divert
the waters from the navigable waterbody altogether, an action
that is manifestly "inconsistent" with navigation for any purpose whatsoever. Id. at 484.
4.5. Uses Incidental to Passage on Streams Passage along a small stream frequently entails touching the
bottom, sometimes requires touching or even going upon the
banks, and may involve other activities, such as fishing. Apart
from a few cases that approve anchoring, no New York cases
have been found which explicitly deal with the legality of
touching the bottom or shores, poling, lining, portaging or
scouting in connection with lawful passage. Yet, from time immemorial, these shore and bottom uses have presumably been
unavoidable physical necessities for travel along smaller navigable rivers and streams. Apparently, no one has ever seen fit
to challenge whether the public right of passage includes a
right to make reasonable use of the bed and banks of a stream
for purposes that are necessary incidents of passage itself.
The right to make at least some minimal bottom and
shore use in passage follows from the ordinary common law of
easements. As the cases frequently state, the public right of
passage is an easement. See supra § 4.2.1. It is an easement of
way which came into existence by implied reservation when
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the state (or king) originally conveyed the servient riparian
lands to their first private owners. Under the common law of
easements, whenever "a right of way is reserved or granted,
but not specifically defined, the rule is 'that the way need only
be such as is reasonably necessary and convenient for the
purpose for which it was created.'" Dalton v. Levy, 258 N.Y.
161, 167, 179 N.E. 371, 372 (1932) (emphasis added).
"Whatever is essential to the enjoyment of a thing granted
must be taken by implication." Langdon v. City of New York,
93 N.Y. 129, 147 (1883).
The reason for this rule is common-sensical: "Without it
the grant itself would be an absurdity and nullity." Id. at 146.
Quoting Coke on Littleton, the Court of Appeals added: "He
who grants a thing, grants impliedly all that is necessary to
the enjoyment of that thing, and this principle extends to
grants made by the law." Id. at 151 (emphasis added). While
the public right of passage is an unusual easement in that it is
held by the state in a sovereign capacity and in trust for the
people, these are hardly reasons to cut it down.
See also Tucci v. Salzhauer, 40 A.D.2d 712, 713, 336
N.Y.S.2d 721, 723-24 (2d Dept. 1972), aff'd, 33 N.Y.2d 854,
307 N.E.2d 256, 352 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1973) ("The right of access
comprehends, 'necessarily and justly, whatever is needed for
the complete and innocent enjoyment of that right.'" (quoting Trustees, Town of Brookhaven v. Smith, 188 N.Y. 74, 87,
80 N.E. 665, 670 (1907)).
4.5.1. Touching the Bottom - Several cases recognize
a public right to touch the bottom (or shore within the high
water lines) in connection with the public right of passage.
Two dicta indicate limitations, viz. that the touching must be
within the banks of the stream and must be in connection
with navigational use.
4.5.1.1. Recognizing the Right - In Fairchild v.
Kraemer, 11 A.D.2d 232, 235, 204 N.Y.S.2d 823, 825-26 (2d
Dept. 1960), the court wrote of the right to "navigate and
anchor" a boat as depending upon whether the waterbody was
"navigable in fact", without in any way distinguishing between the two, even though anchoring would have probably
required the defendant to touch the bottom.
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/7
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In People v. Kraemer, 164 N.Y.S.2d 423, 433 (Police Ct.
Suff. County 1957), aff'd, 6 N.Y.2d 363, 160 N.E. 633, 189
N.Y.S.2d 878 (1959) the court upheld a boater's right to
anchor on privately owned submerged lands, quoting with approval from Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v.
Briggs, 229 U.S. 82, 87 (1913), as follows: "[T]he public right
of navigation ... must include the right to use the bed of the
water for every purpose which is in aid of navigation."
In Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 397 (1926),
the Court indicated that privately owned lands under navigable waters (the Hudson River off Manhattan) were subject,
until filled, to navigation and "incident to such use, occasional
mooring may ... take place." This statement clearly appears
to recognize that touching the bottom or shoreline are legitimate when incidental to lawful navigation over private underwater lands.
It should be noted, analogously, that the foreshore of
tidal waters is subject to "touching" in connection with the
public right of passage - on foot when the tide is out - even
if the lands in question are held in private ownership. Barnes
v. Midland R.R. Terminal Co., 193 N.Y. 378, 386 (1908), modified in part, 218 N.Y. 91 (1916) (upholding right of public to
pass under and over a pier on private lands between the high
and low water lines).
See also People v. Johnson, 7 Misc. 2d 385, 387, 166
N.Y.S.2d 732, 734 (Police Ct. Suff. County 1957) ("anchoring
in the lands was [described] as an incident to the exercise of
the public's dominant right of navigation.").
4.5.1.2. Appearing to Limit the Right - In People
v. Waite, 103 Misc. 2d 204, 206, 425 N.Y.S.2d 462, 463 (St.
Law. County Ct. 1979), a prosecution for trespass, the defendant had tied a line from his boat to some brush along the
shore, but the court overturned the conviction without regard
to the question of whether such conduct, in itself, constituted
a trespass, noting: "[T]here was insufficient evidence . . . as
regards the location of the brush and whether it was growing
from the bank of the river or situate within the stream." The
court indicated, however, that "a trespass infraction may be
found if the boat is tied to the shore or anchored." Id. at 207,
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425 N.Y.S.2d at 464. (emphasis added).
In Stewart v. Turney, 237 N.Y. 117, 130, 142 N.E. 437,
442 (1923), the Court of Appeals held that certain unnamed
activities on a privately owned lakeshore, i.e., above the low
water mark of Cayuga Lake, constituted trespass. From the
Appellate Division report, the activities at issue seem to have
been limited to hunting. See Stewart v. Turney, 203 A.D. 486,
197 N.Y.S. 81 (4th Dept. 1922). There was no indication that
the activities in question were in any way related to navigation, and hunting per se is not an activity traditionally said to
be encompassed within the New York public right of passage
on fresh waters.
4.5.2. Carrying or Portaging Around Obstacles Because the public right of passage is an easement, see supra
§§ 4.2.1. and 4.5, the width of the right of way should be
whatever is "necessary for the use for which it was created."
Town of Ulster v. Massa, 144 A.D.2d 726, 728, 535 N.Y.S.2d
460, 461 (3d Dept. 1988). See also Dalton v. Levy, 258 N.Y.
161, 167 (1932); Langdon v. Mayor, 93 N.Y. 129, 145-47 (1883)
("Whatever is essential to the enjoyment of the thing granted
must be taken by implication.").
Numerous cases uphold the principle that a stream may
be navigable in fact and, thus, subject to the public right of
passage, even though the stream has places where there are
rifts, shallows or other obstacles. See supra § 2.3.4 None of
these cases states what boaters are expected (or permitted) to
do when they encounter such obstacles to navigation. Yet the
public right of passage would have little practical significance
on these streams if it did not include the incidental right to
survey and make necessary detours around the obstacles. The
application of the ordinary common law of easements to these
situations seems too obvious to have been litigated.
Above the banks there is "no highway along the margin of
our navigable rivers and lakes." Ledyard v. Ten Eyck, 36
Barb. 102, 127 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1862) (Cazenovia Lake). No
case, however, has ever questioned the public's right to make
the minimal shore uses which, due to topography, are inseparable incidents of passage itself, e.g., portaging, lining and
scouting rapids.
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/7
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In People v. Kraemer, 164 N.Y.S.2d 423, 433 (Police Ct.
Suff. County 1957), the court recognized a right to go ashore
when necessary in connection with navigation even though it
found the particular defendant guilty of trespass in going
upon the foreshore of navigable tidal waters, stating: "[T]he
public right of navigation does not include the right to enter
upon the foreshore when it is in private ownership, except
when and to the extent necessary in the exercise of the right
of navigation. The -defendant . . .does not contend that an
emergency arose.., that required him to go ashore." (emphasis added).
Further support for a right to go ashore when necessary
in connection with navigation is to be found in the larger context of common law. The right of members of the public to
deviate from blocked public ways and go onto privately owned

land is long established. See 1 HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY,
TORTS 49 (2d ed. 1986); PROSSER AND KEETON, TORTS 145-148
(5th ed. 1984). The principle was recognized in New York over
a century ago, and it has never been denied: "A person travelling on a public highway, and finding a place foundrious and
impassible, has doubtless a right to remove enough of the
fences in the adjoining close to enable him to pass around the
obstruction." Williams v. Safford, 7 Barb. 309, 314 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1849). This principle is, moreover, a part of the general
American common law, as evidenced by the following in the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 195 (1965):
A traveler on a public highway who reasonably believes
that such highway is impassable, is privileged, when he
reasonably believes it to be necessary in order to continue
his journey, to enter, to a reasonable extent and in a reasonable manner, upon neighboring land in the possession
of another ....
See also citations dating from the year 1679 and after in the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS §

195 (1965).

Even more directly on point, the Restatement describes
the right to navigate upon navigable waters as including "the
ancillary privilege to enter on riparian land to the extent that
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this is necessary for the accomplishment of the (purpose of
the) principal privilege." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
193, Comment d (1965). This privilege is really only a particular application of the general common law rule already noted
above for defining the extent of rights of way which are not
specifically defined, viz. the way will be such as is "reasonably
necessary and convenient for the purpose for which it was
created." Dalton v. Levy, 258 N.Y. 161, 167 (1932). See supra

§ 4.5.
In summary, despite the paucity of direct judicial confirmation, all of the pointers in the case law indicate that the
public right of passage includes a right to use riparian lands
insofar as is reasonably necessary to accomplish safe passage
itself. It is not the policy of the common law to withhold that
which would be "essential to the enjoyment of a thing
granted" and without which "the grant itself would be an absurdity and nullity." Langdon v. Mayor, 93 N.Y. 129, 145-46
(1883). An implicit right to make some minimal shore use is
essential in order for the many cases which define rivers with
obstacles as "navigable in fact" to make any sense.
4.5.3. Fishing - According to Lord Hale, the English
law gave riparian owners on freshwater streams "the propriety
of the soil, and consequently, the right of fishing usque ad filum aquae ... ." (emphasis added). See Hargrave's Hale, De
Jure Maris at ch. 1, quoted in People v. Platt, 17 Johns. Rep.
195, 209 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819). In the first New York case involving a navigable freshwater stream, the court followed the
English precedent and held that the exclusive right of fishery
belongs to the owner of the streambed. Hooker v. Cummings,
20 Johns. 90, 100-01 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822). More recent cases,
however, have recognized that freshwater streams subject to
the public right of passage are also subject to a public right to
fish, at least from a boat.
As also noted earlier, the Court of Appeals has, at one
point, strongly suggested that Lord Hale misconceived the
English law of fresh water ownership entirely, See supra § 3.
Ownership of Streambeds. While the Court of Appeals eventually reconfirmed New York's general adherence to the Hale
version of things, putting the beds of fresh water in private
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/7
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ownership, it did so on the assumption that the public rights
of "fishing, ferrying and transportation" were preserved. See
infra discussion of Hooker v. Cummings.
In People v. Waite, 103 Misc. 2d 204, 425 N.Y.S.2d 462
(St. Law. County Ct. 1979), a prosecution for trespass, the defendant was accused of fishing in a posted stream (the St. Regis River) from a boat. The locus in quo was within an area
that had been leased for exclusive fishing and hunting to a
private club. The court wrote:
[A]s the West Bank of the St. Regis River is by the trial
evidence shown to afford a channel for useful commerce
of a substantial and permanent character, and the stream
is not privately owned, neither . . . [riparian]... can be
found to own the water flowing in front of the premises. A
person boating on the waters is, therefore, not a trespasser, even if he utilizes the stream for fishing ....
Id. at 207, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 464.
In People v. Johnson, 7 Misc. 2d 385, 388, 166 N.Y.S.2d
732, 735 (Police Ct. Suff. County 1957), the court wrote: "At
common law, the public ordinarily had the right to hunt and
fish in waters subject to the public right of navigation." The
court cited Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Shultz, 116 N.Y. 382, 387
(1889) which stated that: "The right to navigate the public
waters and to fish therein are public rights belonging to the
People at large." The court also cited Slingerland v. International Contr. Co., 169 N.Y. 60, 72 (1901), which held that
"[f]ishing in navigable rivers.... is presumptively common to
the public . . . ." Insofar as these cases expressed views concerning non-tidal waters, it should be noted that all three provide only dictum. They are, however, consistent with the apparent intent of the Court of Appeals to preserve public
fishing when, in Smith v. City of Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463, 481
(1883) it confined the "navigable in fact" criterion of state
ownership (American rule) to the Hudson and the Mohawk
Rivers. See infra.
In Smith v. City of Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463, 480 (1883),
the court recognized a public right of fishing as the co-equal
71

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6

of transportation, asserting: "[Tihe rights and interests of the
public, such as fishing, ferrying and transportation, are preserved in all navigable waters by the inherent and inalienable
attributes of the sovereign . ...
In Gould v. James, 6 Cow. 369, 376 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826),
there was dictum quoting the English private-fishery rule as
the law "of this state".
In Ex parte Jennings, 6 Cow. 518, 527 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1826), the rule was recognized, in dictum, that "the owners of
land on the margin, above tide water, have been allowed the
several and exclusive right of fishery."
In Hooker v. Cummings, 20 Johns. 90, 100-01 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1822), it was held to be a trespass to fish in the Salmon
River (near Lake Ontario) even though the stream was navigable in fact. The court stated that it was following the English rule that, above the ebb and flow of the tides, "the adjoining owners have the exclusive right" - including the exclusive
right of fishery. [This case was severely criticized in People ex
rel. Loomis v. Canal Appraisers, 33 N.Y. 461, 474-77 (1865),
the case which adopted the American majority rule - albeit
temporarily - as the law of New York (i.e., navigability in
fact is navigability in law)]. See supra Chapter III. Although
the Loomis adoption of the American majority rule for defining "navigable" was later repudiated by Smith v. City of
Rochester, quoted above, the part of Loomis that concedes a
public right of fishing on all streams navigable in fact (see
above quote) apparently survived.
Cf.:
Hill v. Bishop, 63 Hun. 624, 17 N.Y.S. 297, 298 (5th Dept.
1892) (dictum appearing to recognize the English rule that the
exclusive right of fishery is owned by the bed owner of a
pond).
People v. Platt, 17 Johns. 195, 216 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819):
"[T]he river Saranac is not capable of being used as a passageway for boats, or water craft of any kind ... The fishery
itself has passed under the grants . ..."
4.5.4. Limitations on the Public Right of Passage
- The courts in New York have seldom had occasion to address what limitation might apply to the public's right of
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/7
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passage.
In Smith v. Odell, 234 N.Y. 267, 271-72, 137 N.E. 325, 326
(1922), the court upheld exclusive hunting leases for Great
South Bay made by the Town of Brookhaven. The court
found that the town is the owner of the bed of the bay under
colonial patents which expressly gave Brookhaven the exclusive rights of "fishing, hawking, hunting and fowling." In the
view of the Appellate Division, the right of passage incidentally included a right to take wild fowl. Smith v. Odell, 194
A.D. 763, 766, 185 N.Y.S. 647, 649 (2d Dept. 1921). The Court
of Appeals disagreed, in this particular case, because of the
colonial patent. The latter court stated: "The public right,
whatever it might otherwise be, must be held limited in such a
situation to the right to use the waters for the purposes of a
public highway." Smith v. Odell, 234 N.Y. at 272, 137 N.E. at
327. The court added that "the easement of passage over navigable water does not involve a surrender of other privileges
which are capable of enjoyment without interference with the
navigator." Id.
In People ex rel. New York, 0. & W. Ry. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 116 Misc. 774, 775, 191 N.Y.S. 464, 466 (Sup. Ct.
1921) (Susquehanna River), the court observed, as dictum:
"The easement . . . gives to the public the right to use the
stream for the purposes of navigation only."
In Ex Parte Jennings, 6 Cow. 518, 527, 528 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1826), it was said: "The public right is one of passage, and
nothing more; as in a common highway. It is called by the
cases an easement; and the proprietor of the adjoining land
has a right to use the land and water of the river in any way
not inconsistent with this easement." Quoted in Smith v.
Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463, 485 (1883) (emphasis added).
4.6. Conveyances of Underwater Land Free of
Public Navigation Rights - The settled rule is that the
state legislature has, within certain limits, the power to convey land under navigable waters without preserving the public
right of passage. The limitations on this legislative power to
abridge or extinguish the public right are, speaking generally,
requirements of public interest, but the limitations have not
been defined by the courts with any specificity.
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For the most part, in cases where extinguishment of the
jus publicum has been judicially approved, the underwater areas affected were typically at the water margins and relatively
small compared with the waterway as a whole. The New York
courts have consistently struck down wholesale divestitures to
private interests of massive areas under water, and they have
never allowed the public right of passage to be extinguished to
such an extent as to render whole stretches of navigable water
non-navigable.
It should be noted that most of the cases which consider
these questions involve express grants of lands under tidal
waters. The cases make no suggestion, however, that the state
has any less power to grant lands free of the public's navigation rights in fresh waters - nor that its power in respect to
fresh waters is subject to less stringent limitations. The following differences should, however, be noted:
1. In the case of tidal waters, a "special effort" must be
made for the state to convey any title whatsoever to underwater lands. Without an explicit intention to the contrary, grants of shorelands held by the sovereign are presumed not to include any interest in lands below the high
water line. See Tiffany v. Town of Oyster Bay, 209 N.Y.
1, 9, 102 N.E. 585, 587 (1913); Sage v. Mayor, 154 N.Y.
61, 69-70, 47 N.E. 1096, 1097-98 (1897). On the other
hand, if it is found that the state did make a valid unconditional grant of lands under tidal waters - especially if
for a consideration - the applicable rule permits the
public's right of passage to be impaired by the grant "so
as to make [the grant] effectual for some purpose." Langdon v. New York, 93 N.Y. 129, 144 (1883). See also People v. Steeplechase Park Co., 218 N.Y. 459, 469, 113 N.E.
521, 523 (1916) ("If it had been [the] intention to reserve
to the public a right of passage over the lands included in
the grant, they would have provided therefor . . ").
2. In the case of fresh waters, no "special effort" need be
made for the state to convey private title to underwater
lands. On the contrary, any grant of lands adjacent to a
non-tidal stream is presumed to carry title to the center
of the stream, subject to the public's right of passage. See
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supra §§ 3.2 and 3.4. While the ownership of lands under
fresh waters thus passes easily - indeed, by implication
-from the sovereign to private hands, there has never
been the corresponding tendency to presume that the private titles in fresh waters are intended to be free of the
public's right of passage. See Shaw v. Crawford, 10 Johns.
236, 238 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813) ("Individuals who occupy
the adjoining banks may use the waters for their own
emolument, so far only as it can be done without any material interruption of the public use.").
4.6.1. State Has Power to Convey Free of Public
Navigation Rights - Many cases, including virtually all of
the more recent cases, hold, or at least recognize, that the
state has the power to convey underwater lands free of public
navigation rights.
In United States v. Kane, 602 F.2d 490, 493 (2d Cir.
1979), the court recognized the possibility that a private
owner might have a right to fence off the foreshore (on tidal
waters), stating that "it is not at all clear that free access
along the foreshore has been held to be a public right in New
York when the state ... has conveyed the right to a portion of
the foreshore to a private party." Because of such possibility,
the court reversed a grant of summary judgment to remove
the fences.
In Riviera Ass'n, Inc. v. North Hempstead, 52 Misc. 2d
575, 582, 276 N.Y.S.2d 249, 256-57 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967), the
court summarized the cases as follows: "[While conveyance of
lands under water for a public purpose is permissible because
it accords with the public trust, purpose is not the determinative factor [citations omitted]. Rather the validity of the conveyance turns on the degree to which the public interest will
be impaired. . . ." At another point it noted that: "Such limitation upon alienation of land under water as there is exists to
protect the public right of navigation and other lawful uses of
the water." [Citations omitted] Id. at 579, 276 N.Y.S.2d at
253. (Upheld a conveyance by town of filled tidal lands where
navigation was "in no way adversely affected by the fill ......
Id. at 579, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 254).
In People v. New York & Ontario Power Co., 219 A.D.
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114, 115-117, 219 N.Y.S. 497, 500 (3d Dept. 1927), the court
wrote that the legislature may "grant unconditional rights in
shore waters or in streams, [citations omitted] if such right
• . . will not unreasonably interfere with the general use and
control of the public waters." (citations omitted).
In Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 383-84
(1926), the United States Supreme Court considered the effect
of a conveyance of certain underwater lands on the west side
of Manhattan. The Court concluded, after an extensive review, that:
[Wihenever the legislature deemed it to be in the public
interest to grant a deed in fee simple to land under tidal
waters and exclude itself from its exercise as sovereign of
the jus publicum, that is the power to preserve and regulate navigation, it might do so; but that conclusion that it
had excluded the jus publicum could only be reached
upon clear evidence of its intention and of the public interest in promotion of which it acted.
Id. (emphasis added).
The court affirmed that the state may "by an absolute
deed of land under water, with the right of the grantee to fill
it, part with its own power to regulate the navigation of water
over this land which would interfere with its ownership and
enjoyment by the grantee." Id. at 388-89.
In its opinion in Appleby, the New York Court of Appeals had declared: "It scarcely needs assertion that [the government] could not destroy the navigability of the Hudson by
making exclusive private grants." Appleby v. City of New
York, 235 N.Y. 351, 361, 139 N.E. 474, 475 (1923). The Court
of Appeals had upheld the city's right to dredge Appleby's
land on the grounds that Appleby's ownership was, in any
event, subject to the federal navigation easement. The United
States Supreme Court held that the federal navigation easement did not, however, somehow preserve that the rights of
the city once it had conveyed the jus publicum to Appleby's
predecessor. 271 U.S. at 399-402. Accord Waterford Elec.
Light, Heat & Power Co. v. State, 208 A.D. 273, 287, 203
N.Y.S. 858, 871 (3d Dept. 1924), aff'd, 239 N.Y. 629, 147 N.E.
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225 (1925) (The "State [sic], as between itself and the claimant, cannot be heard to raise the bar of the Federal act to
avoid payment of compensation .... ).
In James Frazee Milling Co. v. State, 122 Misc. 545, 549,
204 N.Y.S. 645, 649 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1924) (Seneca River), the
court wrote:
It is well established in this country that the Legislature
of the state may, as the representative of the people,
grant the soil or confer an exclusive privilege in navigable
rivers or waters held by it for the people, or authorize a
use inconsistent with the public right, or interfere with
the right of navigation, (emphasis added) so far as the
public is concerned, when acting in the public interest."
(emphasis in original).
In First Construction Co. v. New York, 221 N.Y. 295, 316,
116 N.E. 1020, 1026 (1917) (Gowanus Bay), an action for just
compensation for an alleged taking of lands under tidal waters
the court wrote: "[Ain act granting the right to fill in lands
under water, and thereby acquire title to the same, gives an
inchoate, vested interest in the lands described which is a
property right . ..."
In People v. Steeplechase Park Co., 218 N.Y. 459, 113
N.E. 521 (1916), the court upheld the right of a private owner
of Atlantic Ocean foreshore lands to obstruct the public's
right of passage, observing that the owner had received "an
unrestricted fee", Id. at 469, 113 N.E. at 523, and that since
1786, "thousands of grants have been made, some with, and
some without restrictions, some absolute, and some conditional. Upon the faith of the title of lands so conveyed in fee
there are now docks, wharves, and buildings . . .lands filled
in, built upon and beneficially enjoyed worth millions of dollars." Id. at 471, 113 N.E. at 524. "If it had been [the government officers'] intention to reserve to the public a right of
passage over the lands included in the grant, they would have
provided therefor .... ." Id. at 469, 113 N.E. at 523. "[A] grant
for 'beneficial enjoyment' to a grantee, his heirs and assigns,
imports a fee .... ." Id. at 472, 113 N.E. 524.
In People v. D. & H. Co., 213 N.Y. 194, 199, 107 N.E. 506,
77

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6

507 (1914), the court wrote: "The state, except for [federal
constitutional] limitations, has power to grant the title to
lands under water, unconditionally or conditionally, or it may
grant special rights therein, or it may restrict the boundaries
of navigable waters by defining the same." (emphasis added).
In Long Sault Dev. Co. v. Kennedy, 212 N.Y. 1, 8, 105
N.E. 849 (1914), the court wrote: "The power of the legislature to grant land under navigable waters to private persons
or corporations for beneficial enjoyment has been exercised
too long and has been affirmed by this court too often to be
open to serious question . . . ." Id. at 8, 105 N.E. at 851. The
court nevertheless held the attempted grant invalid noting
that "[iut virtually turns over to the corporation entire control
of navigation at the Long Sault Rapids." on the St. Lawrence
River. Id. at 9, 105 N.E. at 852 (emphasis added).
In People v. New York & Staten Island Ferry Co., 68
N.Y. 71, 78 (1877), the court stated that "the legislature may,
as the representative of the people, grant the soil, or confer an
exclusive privilege in tidewaters, or authorize a use inconsistent with the public right . . . ." (emphasis added).
In Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wend. 9, 20-21 (N.Y. 1829), the
chancellor observed the following distinction:
[tihe king as parens patriae owned the soil under all the
waters of all navigable [i.e., tidal] rivers ... for the benefit of his subjects at large; who were entitled to the free
use of the sea, and all tide water, for the purposes of navigation, fishing, &c., . . . The king can not now deprive his
subjects of their rights, by granting the public navigable
waters to individuals. But there can be no doubt of the
right of parliament in England, or the legislature of this
state, to make such grants, to make such grants, when
they do not interfere with the vested rights of particular
individuals.
(emphasis added). Quoted with approval in Gould v. Hudson
River R.R., 6 N.Y. 522, 539 (1852).
Other cases recognizing the state's power to grants rights
which may impair or destroy public right of passage follow:
"The policy of the State, since an early time in the hishttps://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/7
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tory of our State, has been directed toward encouraging the
private development of waterfronts, subject only to the condition that the use be reasonable and not obstructive of navigation [Citation omitted]." Town of Hempstead v. Oceanside
Yacht HarborInc., 38 A.D.2d 263, 266, 328 N.Y.S.2d 894, 898
(2d Dept. 1972), aff'd, 32 N.Y.2d 859, 299 N.E.2d 895, 346
N.Y.S.2d 529 (1973).
People v. New York & Ontario Power Co., 219 A.D. 114,
116, 219 N.Y.S. 497, 501 (3d Dept. 1927): The legislature may
"for the advantage of the public.. . grant unconditional rights
in shore waters or in streams [Citation omitted] if such right
. . .will not unreasonably interfere with the general use and
control of the pubic waters."
Barnes v. Midland R.R. Terminal Co., 193 N.Y. 378, 386
(1908), modified in part, 218 N.Y. 91 (1916) (Pier between
high and low water lines on tidal waters could obstruct public
passage only to the extent necessary to permit reasonable use
of the upland.).
Ledyard v. Ten Eyck, 36 Barb. 102, 126 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1862) (Cazenovia Lake: When "[tihe defendant entered into
possession [by lawfully filling] the shallow water in front of
and next to his property ... the trusteeship of the state...
was virtually at an end.").
See also:
Bay Ridge Dock Co. Inc. v. United Dry Docks Inc., 146
Misc. 404, 262 N.Y.S. 212 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1932), aff'd, 237 A.D.
900, 261 N.Y.S. 1002 (2d Dept. 1933).
In Saunders v. New York Central and Hudson River
R.R., 144 N.Y. 75, 86, 38 N.E. 992, 994 (1894), the court
stated: "While the state holds title to lands under navigable
waters in a certain sense as a trustee for the public, it is competent for the supreme legislative power to authorize and regulate grants of the same for public, or such other purposes as
it may determine to be for the best interests of the state ..
Other Cases:
In Riviera Ass'n, Inc. v. N. Hempstead, 52 Misc. 2d 575,
579, 276 N.Y.S.2d 249, 253 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967), the court indicated that lawfully filled underwater land loses its character
as "navigable"; but cf. Romart Properties,Inc. v. City of New
79
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Rochelle, 67 Misc. 2d 162, 171, 324 N.Y.S.2d 277, 286 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1971), aff'd, 40 A.D.2d 987, 338 N.Y.S.2d 247 (2d
Dept. 1972) (one who fills does not acquire riparian rights of
"upland owner").
In In re City of New York, 295 N.Y. 415, 429, 68 N.E.2d
422, 427-28 (1946), the court wrote: "[T]he rule that 'land
originally under water is treated as land under water even after it is filled' is not an inflexible one ... [L]and under water
may lose its 'character of foreshore' at least for some purposes
... where the filling is pursuant to permission or grant."
In Tiffany v. Town of Oyster Bay, 234 N.Y. 15, 20, 136
N.E. 224, 225 (1922), the court wrote: "When the sovereign
grants to the owner of the adjacent upland the title to lands
under navigable waters, such owner may... fill in such lands,
make upland out of them, and extinguish the jus publicum.
(citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Roe v. Strong, 107 N.Y. 350, 358, 14 N.E. 294, 296 (1887)
("The title to the soil under navigable waters vested in the
Long Island towns under the colonial patents was, undoubtedly, subject to the public right of navigation, and it would
seem to follow that the towns could not alienate the title so
acquired to the material prejudice of the common right."
(emphasis added)).
Williams v. Mayor of New York, 105 N.Y. 419, 428, 11
N.E. 829, 830 (1887) ("This right was tantamount to an ownership. It embraced the entire beneficial interest, and was inconsistent with any title remaining in the State .... All use
for the floating of vessels disappeared, so far as it [the wharf]
occupied the water.").
Mayor of New York v. Law, 125 N.Y. 380, 26 N.E. 471
(1891).
4.6.2. State Has No Power to Convey Free of
Navigation Easement - A few cases contain dicta to the
apparent effect that the state does not have the power to convey underwater lands free of public navigation rights.
"[A]nyone who secured a grant or patent from the State
Government of lands under waters took the same subject to
the right of navigation, travel along the foreshore, fishing and
bathing ...[This] has been sometimes referred to as the "jus
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/7
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publicum". Town of Smithtown v. Poveromo, 71 Misc. 2d 524,
531, 336 N.Y.S.2d 764, 773-74 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972), rev'd on
other grounds, 79 Misc. 2d 42, 359 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1973) (Nissequogue River).
In People ex rel. New York, 0. & W. Ry. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 116 Misc. 774, 775, 191 N.Y.S. 464, 466 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1921) (Susquehanna River), the court observed, as dictum:
"The easement pertains to the sovereignty of the state [and]
is inalienable .... .
In Smith v. Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463, 477 (1883), the court
wrote: "Among other rights which pertain to sovereignty is
that of using, regulating and controlling for special purposes
the waters of all navigable lakes or streams, whether fresh or
salt, and without regard to the ownership of the soil beneath
the water. This right is known as the jus publici and is
deemed to be inalienable." (emphasis added). The court may,
however, have been confusing the state's general legislative
power (police power), which is, of course, inalienable with the
public navigation easement, sometimes known as the "jus
publicum" .
Miller v. City of New York, 15 N.Y.2d 34, 35, 203 N.E.2d
478, 480, 255 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1964) (property impressed with a
trust for the public cannot be alienated without express legislative sanction). See also Brooklyn Park Comm'n v. Armstrong, 45 N.Y. 234 (1871).
4.6.3. Effect of Conveyance Free of Public Navigation Right - In Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S.
364, 397 (1926), in holding that a conveyance, with right to
fill, of underwater lands would convey the jus publicum, the
Court observed:
Of course we do not intend to say that, under such deeds
as these, as long as water connected with the river remains over the land conveyed and to be filled, navigation
may not go on and boats may not ply over it, and that
incident to such use occasional mooring may not take
place.
Nevertheless, "[als the city has parted with the jus pub81
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licum in respect to these lots, it . . . must be content with
sailing over it with boats as it finds it." Id. at 400.
Once the jus publicum has been conveyed, "the city [or
state] can be revested with [that] only by a condemnation of
the rights granted." Id. at 399. Any effort to regulate or improve navigation in the meantime, as by dredging the underwater lots conveyed, "is a trespass upon the plaintiff's [private
owner's] rights." Id. at 400. In summary, while the public may
still ply the waters over lands conveyed for use inconsistent
with navigation, so long as they are wet, eminent domain
would be required to re-establish the state's power to promote
and preserve public right to navigate.
In First Construction Co. v. New York, 221 N.Y. 295, 316,
116 N.E. 1020, 1026 (1917) (Gowanus Bay), an action for just
compensation for an alleged taking of lands under tidal waters, the court wrote: "an act granting the right to fill in lands
under water, and thereby acquire title to the same, gives and
inchoate, vested interest in the lands described which is a
property right and.., the grantee cannot be deprived without
compensation."
See also: Bay Ridge Dock Co. v. United Dry Docks, 146
Misc. 404, 262 N.Y.S. 212 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1932), aff'd, 237 A.D.
900, 261 N.Y.S. 1002 (2d Dept. 1933).
4.6.4. Limitations on the State's Power to Convey
Free of Public Navigation Right - While many New
York cases approve an extinguishment of the public right of
passage, in none of these cases did the state attempt to convey
the entire channel or navigational right-of-way so as to totally
close a navigable waterway for its entire breadth over a substantial length. The case of Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois,
146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892), is the landmark "public trust" case
standing for the proposition that such an extravagant conveyance of the public right would be invalid. In considering a
purported conveyance by Illinois of 1000 acres under Lake
Michigan - the entire Chicago harbor plus some - the
United States Supreme Court said:
It is grants of parcels under navigable waters . . . for
structures . . .in aid of commerce, and grants of parcels
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/7
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which, being occupied, do not substantially impair the
public interest in the lands and waters remaining, that
are chiefly considered and sustained in the adjudged cases
as a valid exercise of legislative power consistently with
the [public] trust ....
It is only by observing the distinction between a grant of such parcels for the improvement of the public interest or which when occupied do
not substantially impair the public interest in the lands
and waters remaining,and a grant of the whole property
in which the public is interested that the language of
the adjudged cases can be reconciled.

Id. at 453 (emphasis added).
Although the quoted portion of the Illinois Central case is,
strictly speaking, a statement of Illinois law, it was cited with
approval and followed in Long Sault Dev. Co. v. Kennedy, 212
N.Y. 1, 10 (1914), and Coxe v. State, 144 N.Y. 396, 39 N.E.
400 (1895).
In Coxe v. State, 144 N.Y. 396, 405 (1895), the Court of
Appeals acknowledged "the power of the sovereign to alienate
lands under tide waters," but it noted that:
the courts have never yet attempted to fix the precise limits of the legislative power ....
It is very difficult and
perhaps wholly impracticable to do so. It would, no
doubt, be difficult to reconcile all the numerous expressions of opinion to be found in the decisions on this question. In many of them general language is used which
would seem to sanction the doctrine of absolute ownership and the unrestrained power of disposition by the
sovereign, but... [when] read and understood with reference to the special facts of each case, . . .much of the
apparent conflict disappears.
Id. at 406.
The court in Coxe concluded with the following general
principles: "The title which the state holds [in lands under
navigable waters] . . . cannot be surrendered, alienated or delegated, except for some public purpose, or some reasonable
use which can fairly be said to be for the public benefit." Id.
at 406. (emphasis added). As examples, it listed: (a) a grant to
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a municipality, (b) grants to railroads, (c) grants to persons
engaged in commerce or navigation, and (d) grants to adjoining upland owners for beneficial enjoyment or commercial
purposes, but not (e) grants "for mere speculative purposes".
Id. at 407.
4.6.4.1. Limitation: No Substantial Interference
with Navigation - In Moyer v. State, 56 Misc. 2d 549,
551, 289 N.Y.S.2d 114, 116 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1968), the court upheld the right of a riparian owner to build out into a bay of
Lake Ontario, but stated as a limitation: "[A]ny use made of
the riparian rights must be such that it does not interfere with
navigation ......
In New York Power & Light Corp. v. State, 230 A.D. 338,
343, 245 N.Y.S. 44, 50 (3d Dept. 1930), the court wrote:
The state may unconditionally convey a valid title in the
beds and waters of a navigable stream when the conveyance is made for a valuable consideration, in aid of the
development of public waters for navigation and commerce or in the interests of the public .... but only when
it does not unduly interfere with the development of the
stream for navigation and commerce. (emphasis added).
In People v. New York & Ontario Power Co., 219 A.D.
114, 116, 219 N.Y.S. 497, 501 (3d Dept. 1927), the court wrote
that the legislature may "grant unconditional rights in shore
waters or in streams if such right[s]... will not unreasonably
interfere with the general use and control of the public
waters."
In Finch, Pruyn & Co. v. State, 122 Misc. 404, 410, 203
N.Y.S. 165, 170 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1924), reviewing the claim of a
prescriptive easement to maintain a dam on the Hudson River
at Glens Falls (deemed "navigable in fact"), the court wrote:
"There can be no doubt it would have been entirely competent for the Legislature at any time to have granted the claimant the right to maintain its dam where now located, saving to
the public its navigable rights in the stream." (emphasis
added).
In Appleby v. City of New York, 235 N.Y. 351, 362, 139
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N.E. 474, 476 (1923), rev'd on other grounds, 271 U.S. 364
(1926), the Court of Appeals said: "But no case holds that any
substantial interference with navigation may thus be authorized [by grants of submerged lands with the right to fill]."
In Long Sault Dev. Co. v. Kennedy, 212 N.Y. 1, 8-9, 105
N.E. 849, 852 (1914), the court invalidated an attempt by the
legislature to transfer away "control of navigation" at the
Long Sault rapids of the St. Lawrence River, saying that, for
such a conveyance to be valid, "[t]he contemplated use . . .
must be reasonable and one which can fairly be said to be for
public benefit or not injurious to the public." Id. at 10 (emphasis added). The court added that the legislature cannot
authorize a conveyance of the navigable portion of the river,
"thereby parting for all time with its own power to improve
such navigation." Id. at 10.
See also Niagara Falls Power Co. v. Duryea, 185 Misc.
696, 704, 57 N.Y.S.2d 777, 784-85 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1945).
But cf. People v. Steeplechase Park Co., 218 N.Y. 459,
479-80, 113 N.E. 521, 527 (1916), upholding the foreshore
owner's right to maintain fences, barriers, platforms, pavilions
and other structures on lands under navigable waters, where
the court observed: "Where the state has conveyed lands
without restriction intending to grant a fee therein for beneficial enjoyment, the title of the grantee . . . is absolute ..
(emphasis added).
4.6.4.2. Limitation: Extent of Conveyance Cannot
Be Too Expansive - In Marba Sea Bay Corp. v. Clinton
St. Realty Corp., 272 N.Y. 292, 5 N.E.2d 824 (1936), the court
held that the attempted grant of practically the entire ocean
front in Queens County was invalid.
In Long Sault Dev. Co. v. Kennedy, 212 N.Y. 1, 8-9
(1914), the court invalidated an attempt by the legislature to
transfer away "control of navigation" at the Long Sault rapids
of the St. Lawrence River.
In Coxe v. State, 144 N.Y. 396, 405, 39 N.E. 400, 401
(1895), the Court of Appeals struck down an attempted transfer by the state of all non-urban wetlands around Staten Island and Long Island, stating that "to confer title to such a
vast domain which the state held for the benefit of the public
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(emphasis added).

4.6.4.3. Limitation: Intent to Cut Down Public
Right Must Be Clear - In respect to a requirement of
clarity of purpose to convey submerged lands free of the public right of passage, the court in People v. Steeplechase Park
Co., 218 N.Y. 459, 473-74, 113 N.E. 521, 527 (1916), quoted
with approval: "[A] legislative permission to appropriate to
individual use a part of the jus publicum, does not, per se,
deprive the public of a right to resume the privilege granted,
unless it appears that it was the intention to vest such privilege irrevocably in the licensee." (quoting Stevens v. Paterson
& Newark R.R. Co., 34 N.J.L. 532, 548 (1869). It added in the
particular case, however, that "[i]f it had been [the government officers'] intention to reserve to the public a right of
passage over the lands included in the grant, they would have
provided therefor." Id. at 469 and "a grant for 'beneficial enjoyment' to a grantee, his heirs and assigns, imports a fee...
"

Id. at 472. (emphasis added).

In New York Power & Light Corp. v. State, 230 A.D. 338,
342, 245 N.Y.S. 44, 50-51 (3d Dept. 1930), the court wrote:
"Grants of gift ...

are conditional grants and are made sub-

ject to the paramount right of the state to improve the stream
...[and] they will be construed against the grantee and, when

they contain no words excluding the governmental control of
the waters, they are subject to the jus publicum."
In Langdon v. Mayor, 93 N.Y. 129, 148 (1883), in upholding a grant of lands under tidal waters with the right to fill in
derogation of the public's right, the court described the applicable distinction as follows: "[AIll grants by the sovereign of
exclusive privileges and franchises, and all gratuitous grants of
land should be strictly construed against the grantee; but...
the same strict rule of construction should not be applied to
grants of land made for a valuable consideration

....

"

(em-

phasis added).
In People v. New York & Staten Island Ferry Co., 68
N.Y. 71, 77 (1877), in which the court declared a pier over
privately owned navigable waters to be a purpresture, it was
said that, while the legislature may authorize a use of tidewaters inconsistent with the public right, the person claiming
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/7
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such must show a clear title.
It will not be presumed that the legislature intended to
destroy or abridge the public right for private benefit, and
words of doubtful or equivocal import will not work this
consequence. Public grants . . . in impairment of public
interests are construed strictly against the grantee...
[H]e must be able to show a clear warrant of law to support his claim.
Id. (emphasis added). (Note: In Langdon v. Mayor, 93 N.Y.
129, 145-48 (1883), the court limited this rule of strict construction to gratuitous conveyances. See above.)
In Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wend. 9 (N.Y. 1829), it was indicated that, in a grant by the state of underwater lands without consideration it being in derogation of the rights of the
public, nothing would be implied.
See also City of Geneva v. Henson, 140 A.D. 49, 53, 124
N.Y.S. 588, 591-92 (1910) (conveyance of the bed of Seneca
Lake by New York State to Massachusetts would require express language in the grant.)
4.6.4.4. Judicial Review may be Limited - In Waterford Elec. Light, Heat & Power Co. v. State, 208 A.D. 273,
284-85, 203 N.Y.S. 858, 870 (3d Dept. 1924), aff'd, 239 N.Y.
629, 147 N.E. 225 (1925) (Hudson at Van Schoenhoven
rapids), the court recognized that the state could release the
public "easement of passage" or grant a "right to defeat or
diminish the public use," subject to limitations. But in regard
to judicial review, it quoted with approval: "It is primarily for
the Legislature, and not for the courts, to determine between
the conflicting interests and the necessity of requiring the
navigation right to yield, and its discretion will not be interfered with by the courts, except in cases of plain and gross
abuse of discretion." Despite this disclaimer of judicial review
authority, it went on to hold that the particular legislative
grant at issue was valid, on the stated ground that "it could
not materially affect navigation." Id. at 286.
In James Frazee Milling Co. v. State, 122 Misc. 545, 549,
204 N.Y.S. 645, 649 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1924) (Seneca River), the
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court stated that the Legislature could "authorize a use [of
navigable rivers] inconsistent with the public right, or interfere with the right of navigation, so far as the public is concerned, when acting in the public interest." But, the court
added, "[w]hether a grant or privilege is in the public interest
is for the sole determination of the Legislature." Id. (emphasis added).
In upholding the destruction, on authority from the Legislature, of a riparian owner's access by navigation over a portion of the Hudson River (subject to the tides), the court in
Gould v. Hudson River R.R., 6 N.Y. 523, 543 (1852), asked:
"Who is to judge of the necessity for such destruction, except
the sovereign power, acting through the legislature which represents it? . . . [If not the legislature], a lawsuit would be the
certain consequence of every exercise of this right by the sovereign power."
4.6.5. Destruction of the Public Right of Passage
by Adverse Possession - The general limitation on acquiring a private title to state lands by adverse possession is
that "no time . . . can run against the state as to property
which it could not grant to private individuals, such as forest
lands set aside for a park." Hinkley v. State, 234 N.Y. 309,
315, 137 N.E. 599, 601 (1922). However, the state clearly can
convey lands under navigable waters free of the public navigation easement (jus publicum). See 4.6.1. Thus, it should be at
least theoretically possible for title free of the jus publicum to
be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
It should be recalled, however, that there are legal limitations on the state's power to grant the jus publicum, viz. there
can be no substantial interference with navigation as a result
and the grant cannot be too expansive. See supra § 4.6.4. No
prescriptive right should be allowed to cut down the jus publicum if it would have been unlawful for the state to actually
grant the claimed prescriptive right. The Court of Appeals has
implicitly acknowledged the relevance of such limitations to
the adverse possession context when it specifically considered
the effects on navigation in upholding adverse possession title
to a small streambed in the System Properties case, infra.
In People v. System Properties, Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 330, 342,
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/7
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141 N.E.2d 429, 434, 160 N.Y.S.2d 859, 866 (1957), the Court
of Appeals observed: "Whether title by adverse possession can
ever be successfully claimed as to lands actually held in trust
by the State and appropriated to public uses by the State
seems never to have been flatly decided by the New York appellate courts." The court then held that a private owner of a
dam on a state-owned streambed had, in that case, acquired
title to the streambed by adverse possession. The court made
clear, however, that "the dam standing on this rocky ledge in
the river is at a place where its existence . . .interferes with
no public use." Id.
The Court of Appeals also noted that, in other situations
"a grant to a private individual may not be presumed or adverse possession adjudicated as to lands theretofore appropriated to a public use by the state since such lands are inalienable. Id. quoting Burbank v. Fay, 65 N.Y. 57, 66 et seq. (1875)).
In New York Power & Light Corp. v. State, 230 A.D. 338,
343, 245 N.Y.S. 44, 50-51 (3d Dept. 1930), the court wrote:
The state may unconditionally convey a valid title in the
beds and waters of a navigable stream when the conveyance is made for a valuable consideration, in aid of the
development of public waters for navigation and commerce or in the interests of the public,... but only when
it does not unduly interfere with the development of the
stream for navigation and commerce. Beyond this the
control of the navigable waters . . .can never be validly
conveyed or lost. (emphasis added).
The court added that "[g]rants of gift ...are conditional
grants and are made subject to the paramount right of the
state to improve the stream ... [and] they will be construed
against the grantee and, when they contain no words excluding the governmental control of the waters, they are subject to
the jus publicum." Id. These principles of construction, when
a grantee cannot show that a valuable consideration was paid,
would place a heavy burden upon anyone attempting to assert
that the jus publicum was extinguished by prescription or adverse possession.
In People v. New York & Ontario Power Co., 219 A.D.
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114, 117, 219 N.Y.S. 497, 502 (3d Dept. 1927), the court wrote:
"Rights in the stream which would deprive the State of its
power to improve it for navigation may not be acquired by
adverse possession since the State could not make such a
grant."
In Finch Pruyn & Co. v. State, 122 Misc. 404, 409, 203
N.Y.S. 165, 170 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1924), the court considered the
issue of whether the private claimant could have acquired a
prescriptive easement to maintain its dam on the Hudson
River at Glens Falls (deemed "navigable in fact"). The court
concluded that the claimant had acquired a prescriptive easement in the stream despite the rule that "no prescriptive right
can be sustained, when the presumed grant upon which such
right is based would, if made, be unlawful."
The court in Finch Pruyn reasoned that "it would have
been entirely competent for the Legislature at any time to
have granted the claimant the right to maintain its dam where
now located, saving to the public its navigable rights in the
stream." Id. at 410, 203 N.Y.S. at 170 (emphasis added).
There was no interference with navigation because, at the particular point, the river "cannot be navigated by boats." 122
Misc. at 403, 203 N.Y.S. at 169. Therefore, the court concluded, "an easement [to maintain the dam] in the bed of a
navigable stream may be acquired by prescription by a private
individual or corporation against the state, provided such
easement does not interfere with navigation, and could otherwise have been the subject of a lawful grant." 122 Misc. at
411, 203 N.Y.S. at 171. (emphasis added).
In People v. Baldwin, 197 A.D. 285, 288, 188 N.Y.S. 542,
544 (3d Dept. 1921), aff'd, 233 N.Y. 672 (1922), the court
wrote as dictum that the state "cannot lose such lands as it
holds for the public, in trust, for a public purpose, as highways, public streams, canals, public fair grounds." (emphasis
added).
In Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. v. New York, 200
N.Y. 400, 421, 94 N.E. 199, 205 (1911), it was observed that
"no lapse of time will furnish a defense to an encroachment
on a public right," but it nevertheless upheld a prescriptive
claim to state lands on the grounds that "such possession and
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/7
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right were not inconsistent with the public right of easement." Id. at 420, 94 N.E. 205. (emphasis added).
In Burbank v. Fay, 65 N.Y. 57, 67 (1875), the court stated
that:
Where no express grant can be allowed, the law will not
resort to the fiction of an implied grant so as to create a
prescriptive right ....The principles thus laid down as to
highways on the land, are plainly applicable to navigable
waters. In the case of a river which was a public highway,
twenty years' enjoyment of the water is not conclusive as
to the right. And if a river ever has been a public highway, even if it should not be used as such for the period
of twenty years, and during that time has been in a condition inconsistent with its use as a public highway, the
public right is not extinguished if it existed previously to
that time.
By analogy, the court rejected a claim to prescriptive rights in
a public canal which, if allowed, "might impair or wholly destroy the use of the canal as a great public highway." Id. at 72.
See also:
Romart Properties,Inc. v. City of New Rochelle, afJ'd, 40
A.D.2d 987, 338 N.Y.S.2d 247 (2d Dept. 1972) (title with right
to fill the tidal Titus Mill Pond in New Rochelle based on
"almost 250 years of adverse possession").
People v. New York and Ontario P. Co., 219 A.D. 114,
117, 219 N.Y.S. 497, 502 (3d Dept. 1927): "Rights in the
stream that would deprive the State of its power to improve it
for navigation may not be acquired by adverse possession because the State could not make such a grant."
Timpson v.Mayor, 5 A.D. 424, 429, 39 N.Y.S. 248, 252
(4th Dept. 1896): "Title to land under a navigable river ...
may be acquired by adverse possession or prescription against
the State ....What may not be acquired is the right to interfere with the public right of navigation."
Commissioners of the Canal Fund v. KempshaUl, 26
Wend. 404, 421 (N.Y. 1841) (implying that title by adverse
possession to the bed of the Genesee River would, like title by
grant, be subject to the public right of passage).
91
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Cf. Bonert v. White, 6 A.D.2d 881, 882, 177 N.Y.S.2d
658, 659-60 (2d Dept. 1958), modified, 7 A.D.2d 748, 181
N.Y.S.2d 763 (2d Dept. 1958), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d 956, 176 N.E.2d
202, 217 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1961): "Title to the soil of a [dry-land]
highway may be obtained by adverse possession, even though
it is impossible either by grant or by prescription to acquire
the public's right of passage and repassage." (citations omitted) (citing waterway cases).
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Chapter V.
REMEDIES FOR INTERFERENCE WITH
THE PUBLIC RIGHT OF PASSAGE
5. Remedies for Interference with the Public
Right of Passage - It is considered a public nuisance for
private persons to obstruct, annoy or interfere with the public
right of passage on a privately-owned navigable stream. As a
general matter, public nuisances are actionable only by the
state. A private person who seeks to abate or redress a public
nuisance must be able to prove that he or she has sustained
"special damage" from the nuisance.
5.1 The English Background - According to Lord
Hale, under the English common law:
[P]art of the king's jurisdiction in reformation of nuisances is to reform and punish nuisances in all rivers,
whether fresh or salt, that are a common passage not only
for ships and greater vessels, but also of smaller as barges
and boats, to reform the obstructions or annoyances that
are therein to such common passage for as the common
highways on land are for the common-land passage, so
these kind of rivers, whether fresh or salt, that bear
boats or barges are highways by water... [A]ll nuisances

and impediments of passages of boats and vessels, though
in the private soil of any person, may be punished by indictments, and removed.
Hargrave's Hale, De Jure Maris, ch. II and III, quoted in
Smith v. City of Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463, 478 (1883) (emphasis
added) (Hemlock Lake). The court also stated that the doctrines of Hale's Treatise "have been frequently cited with approval in our reports and are now indisputable." Id.
5.2. The New York Cases - In Van Cortlandt v.
New York Cent. R.R., 265 N.Y. 249, 262-63, 192 N.E. 401, 406
(1934) (Croton River), the court noted a limitation on the
public's right to intervene in order to preserve the public's
right of passage: "Special damage must be proved resulting
from the public nuisance before relief will be afforded to a
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plaintiff ...." Id. at 262, 192 N.E. at 406. "Even an unlawful
obstruction may not be abated as a nuisance at the suit of
private persons if the State does not complain, and there is no
showing of special damage by the champions of the public
right." Id. at 263, 192 N.E. at 406 (Quoting People ex rel. Lehigh Valley Ry. Co. v. State Tax Comm'r, 247 N.Y. 9, 16, 159
N.E. 703, 707).
In Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Shultz, 116 N.Y. 382, 387, 22
N.E. 564, 565 (1889), the court wrote:
The rights to navigate the public waters and to fish
therein are public rights belonging to the People at large.
...The riparian owner cannot interfere with such user by
the public. Should he attempt to appropriate to his own
use the lands under water in front of his premises, and to
that end should build thereon, it would constitute a purpresture which the state could remove. (citation omitted).
But in Knickerbocker,
the plaintiff could not maintain an action for its abatement. A purpresture is an invasion of the right of property in the soil while the same remains in the People. A
nuisance in such a case as this must be an injury to the
common right of the public to navigate the waters. [citation omitted] And these questions can only be tested in
an action at the suit of the People.
Id. at 389, 22 N.E. at 565 (citations omitted).
In In Re Comm'rs of State Reservation, 37 Hun. 537, 550
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1885), the court stated: "A public nuisance is
an injury to the jus publicum . . . ." It held, however, that a
dam is not a public nuisance if, at the particular location, the
river cannot be navigated anyway.
In Morgan v. King, 35 N.Y. 454, 455 (1866), an action by
lower riparian owners for obstruction of the Racquette River,
the court said that if the river was, "of public right, a common
highway, at the point where its waters are obstructed by the
defendants' dam . . . they are liable for detaining the plaintiff's logs in their passage down stream." (The Racquette was,
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however, found not to be a public highway at the relevant
point.)
In People v. Vanderbilt, 26 N.Y. 287, 293 (1863), an action to remove an obstruction to navigation in the (tidal)
Hudson River, the court made the following distinction:
A purpresture is an invasion of the right of property in
the soil, while the same remains in the king or the people.
A nuisance is an injury to the jus publicum, or common
right of the public to navigate the waters ... If the injury
complained of be a purpresture, it may be abated and removed at suit of the attorney-general ... irrespective of
any damage which may accrue. But where the action is to
remove a nuisance, which is not shown to be a purpresture, a nuisance in fact must in all cases be shown to
exist.
In Ex parte Jennings, 6 Cow. 513, 528 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1826), the court wrote: "If [a riparian owner] make any erection rendering the passage of boats, etc., inconvenient or unsafe, he is guilty of a nuisance." [Quoted in Chenango Bridge
Co. v. Paige, 83 N.Y. 178, 185 (1880) and Smith v. Rochester,
92 N.Y. 463, 484 (1883).]
In Palmerv. Mulligan, 3 Cai. R. 307, 319 (1805), Chancellor Kent wrote: "The Hudson at Stillwater is capable of being
held and enjoyed as private property, but it is, notwithstanding, to be deemed a public highway for public uses, such as
that of rafting lumber .... To obstruct this or any other uses
of the river, by dams &c., would be a nuisance . . . ." (emphasis in original).
Cf. People v. System Properties,2 N.Y.2d 330, 345, 141
N.E.2d 429, 435-36, 160 N.Y.S.2d 859, 868 (1957), in which
the Court of Appeals considered the right of private claimants
to have a dam removed as a "nuisance". The court wrote that
the claimants "would have no absolute right to a mandatory
injunction against the dam. Denial thereof would be discretionary with the court." (citation omitted).
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Stiles v. Hooker, 7 Cow. 266, 268 (1827). (When sued for
injuries to plaintiff's claim, defendant cannot raise the argument that the plaintiff's claim is a public nuisance as a
defense.)
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Chapter VI.
"TAKINGS" IMPLICATIONS
6. "Takings" Implications of Legislation Relating
to the Public Right of Passage - The cases make clear
that a compensable taking occurs only if the effect of a legislative enactment is to impose some new legal burden on landowners. Indeed, under the so-called police power to regulate
property uses, even new legal burdens can be imposed, so long
as the economic impact on landowners is comparatively insubstantial. No compensation is required in any event, however,
if the Legislature merely reaffirms or ratifies existing legal
burdens on the land.
Legislative enactments dealing with the public right of
passage may raise "takings" or just-compensation issues of
two distinct kinds:
1.Would a compensable taking occur if the Legislature
declares a public right of passage to exist on streams or
other water bodies which were not previously subject to
the common-law public right of passage?
Answer: yes, according to several New York cases. See infra §
6.2.2. The reason is that declaring a public right to use new
streams, not "navigable in fact" at common law, would impose
new legal servitudes on landowners. This point is a bit tricky,
however, because the common law is itself not static. In particular, its definitions of "navigable in fact" have been expanded somewhat over the years. See supra §§ 2.3.1. and
2.4.3. Moreover, changes in customary uses, modes of transport and boating technology may also affect the usability of
particula.r streams for navigation and, hence, their navigability in fact. With these qualifications, however, the answer to
the first question is generally yes.
2.What would be the takings implications of legislation
giving boaters a right to make minimal necessary use of
the bottoms and shores of "navigable in fact" streams,
i.e., uses that are inseparable from safe passage itself?
Answer: None, for two reasons.
First, despite the absence of direct holdings, the cases are
97

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6

solidly consistent with the view that the common-law public
right of passage has always included a right to do that which
is reasonably necessary to accomplish passage, including minimum-impact excursions on shore as necessary to safely pass
by obstacles to navigation. See supra § 4.5.
Second, even if on-shore ancillary rights were not deemed
part of the common-law right of passage, both the federal and
state cases recognize that the Legislature can create such
rights as an exercise of the police power, provided that the
interference with private owners' "investment-backed expectations" is transitory and minimal. See infra §§ 6.2 and 6.3.
In questions of takings, both federal and state constitutional principles must be considered. See infra § 6.2.
6.1. Federal Constitutional Considerations - The
United States Supreme Court has held that a private landowner's right to exclude others is "universally held to be a
fundamental element of the property right." Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979). With that in
mind, the Court in Kaiser Aetna struck down an attempt by
the federal government to extend the federal navigation servitude to a previously non-navigable pond (which the owner
had dredged and connected with the sea).
It is not, however, every government impingement on the
owner's "right to exclude" that results in a compensable taking. Only a few months after Kaiser Aetna, for example, the
Supreme Court upheld a state law which required shopping
center owners to permit demonstrators into the shopping
center in order to express their views. PruneYard Shopping
Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). Acknowledging that
even a property right so fundamental as the right to exclude
others can be subjected to modification, one of the justice's
observed that if "common law rights were ... immune from
revision . . . [it] would freeze the common law as it has been
constructed by the courts, perhaps at its 19th century state of
development." Id. at 93 (Marshall, J. concurring).
The Supreme Court's main opinion in the PruneYard
case stated that the Kaiser Aetna case was "quite different".
Of Kaiser Aetna, the Court wrote, the private owners "had
invested substantial amounts of money in dredging the pond,
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developing it into an exclusive marina [which was to be] open
only to fee-paying members, and the fees were paid in part to
'maintain the privacy and security of the pond.'" 447 U.S. at
84 (quoting Kaiser v. Aetna, 444 U.S. at 168. (emphasis
added)). The government's attempt to exploit the product of
these expenditures without payment "interfered with Kaiser
Aetna's 'reasonable investment backed expectations.'" Id.
(emphasis added). By contrast, in the shopping center case,
the private owners "failed to demonstrate that the 'right to
exclude others' is so essential to the use or economic value of
their property that the state-authorized limitation of it
amounted to a 'taking.'" Id. (emphasis added).
All in all, the facts of the PruneYard (shopping center)
case appear to be far closer to the "takings" questions at hand
than the facts of Kaiser Aetna. The average stream-side
owner has neither invested in waterway improvements (such
as the dredging in Kaiser Aetna) nor created any other amenity which passage and its incidents need utilize. In Kaiser
Aetna, the government was, in effect, trying to capture a privately created facility and give it to the public, thereby depriving the owner of its expected reward. By contrast, the average stream-side owner's only investment that is touched
upon in passage is the investment in the landbase itself, the
same as in PruneYard. Also like PruneYard, and unlike Kaiser Aetna, the minimum shore use incidental to passage
would have only a negligible economic impact on the
landowner.
In sum, the federal constitutional case law clearly permits
state legislation to authorize minimal, transitory, low-impact
use by the public of private land. The conclusion follows that
the United States Constitution would not prevent inclusion of
minimal bottom and shore use as part of a legislative public
right of passage, even if such uses were to be considered a
new, albeit insubstantial, legal burden on riparian landowners.
6.2. New York Takings Cases - More than a century before the Kaiser Aetna decision, the New York Court of
Appeals held that the Legislature cannot ipse dixit declare
streams to be public highways if they previously were not, except on payment of just compensation. Morgan v. King, 35
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N.Y. 454 (1866). If the state's just compensation requirement
is more stringent than the federal constitutional requirement,
the state's requirement controls: "The courts of this State
have determined these rules of property [in streams] and have
decided what the State must pay, and when, in the instances
of its seizure of water power rights for purposes of navigation.
In these questions the United States has no concern." Waterford Elec. Light, Heat & Power Co. v. State, 208 A.D. 273,
288, 203 N.Y.S. 858, 873 (3d Dept. 1924), aff'd, 239 N.Y. 629,
147 N.E. 225 (1925) (taking water power Hudson at Van
Schoenhoven rapids: compensable). In other words, if New
York's common law public right of passage is less extensive
than the federal navigation servitude, the state may have to
pay just compensation for a given imposition on private owners even though the Federal government would not. Accord
Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 399-400 (1926).
Based on the New York cases, it is clear that no taking
occurs when the Legislature merely declares or asserts state
authority over a stream that is "navigable in fact", unless the
jus publicum has been previously conveyed. See infra. It is
equally clear that the Legislature cannot extend the public
right of passage to streams not covered by the common law
public right without paying just compensation.
The New York cases provide no direct insight on the
"takings" implications of legislation declaring that the public
right of passage includes necessary incidental uses of stream
bottoms and adjacent shorelands. There is, however, no reason to assume that the New York constitutional law is different from the federal constitutional law on this point. See
supra § 6.1. Indeed, the New York Court of Appeals is, if anything, even more willing than the U.S. Supreme Court to uphold legislation authorizing small scale, low-impact physical
utilization of private land. A forced easement for cable TV
lines upheld under the police power "in view of the minimal
nature of the invasion and the absence of any reasonable expectation ... that the space thus utilized (or invaded) would
ever be income productive." Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 53 N.Y.2d 124, 155, 423 N.E.2d 320, 336,
440 N.Y.S.2d 843, 859 (1981), rev'd, 458 U.S. 419 (1982). The
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New York cases do not provide any reason to believe that a
new legal burden on landowners would be created by legislative authorization of incidental use as is necessary to accom§ 4.5.
plish safe passage. See supra
6.2.1. If State Acting Within its Navigation Powers: No Taking The doctrine must be regarded as settled that whatever
the rights of the owners of lands bordering upon, or
within the waters of, a navigable river, they must yield
when the powers of government are called into exercise
for a general public benefit in the improvement of navigation.... [The individual] can have no private rights in
the river, which are exempt from the requirements of a
public or governmental necessity.
Slingerland v. International Contr. Co., 169 N.Y. 60, 70, 61
N.E. 995, 997 (1901).
"[W]hen [gratuitous grants from the state] contain no
words excluding the governmental control of the waters, they
are subject to the jus publicum. When the state assumes control of the stream . . . it does not take property within the
meaning the Constitution." New York Power & Light Corp. v.
State, 230 A.D. 338, 343, 245 N.Y.S. 44, 50-51 (3d Dept. 1930)
(Mohawk River).
"The Legislature, except under the power of eminent domain, upon making compensation, can interfere with such
streams only for the purpose of regulating, preserving, and
protecting the public easement." People ex rel. New York, 0.
& W. Ry. v. State Tax Comm'n, 116 Misc. 774, 776, 191
N.Y.S. 464, 466 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1921) (analogizing the Susquehanna River with the Chenango River, "a fresh-water stream.
[and] therefore a private river." Id.).
The proprietary interest of the riparian owner is
subordinate to the public easement of passage and ... the
legislature may direct the performance of acts by state officers, which tend to promote the public right of passage
and transportation, without subjecting the state to liability. When, however.... land is taken and the river waters
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are diverted for the purpose of constructing and operating
some other channel distinct from that of the river [viz. a
canal], then the limit of the state's [navigation-easement]
authority . . . has been reached.

Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. v. New York, 200 N.Y. 400,
418, 94 N.E. 199, 204 (1911) (rejected the state's argument
that it was not liable for damages to riparian owners when it
appropriated streambed and waters in building a separate
canal.)
In Chenango Bridge Co. v. Paige, 83 N.Y. 178, 185 (1880),
after first referring to the Chenango River as the "private
property of the riparian owners," the Court of Appeals said:
"The Legislature, except under the power of eminent domain,
upon making compensation, can interfere with such streams
only for purpose of regulating, preserving and protecting the
public easement." (Quoted in Smith v. Rochester, 92 N.Y.
463, 485 (1883)).
6.2.2. Stream Must Be Navigable in Fact, or Else
a Taking Results The rule is that a state Legislature has the power to appropriate by force of its own enactment any flowing
stream to the use of the public as a highway, subject,
however, to the qualification that if a stream is not in fact
navigable, a statute declaring it to be navigable will not
make it so in law as against the pre-existing rights of riparian owners, unless compensation is made to such owners for the value of the rights so destroyed or injured.
People ex rel. New York, 0. & W. Ry. v. State Tax Comm'n,
116 Misc. 774, 778, 191 N.Y.S. 464, 468 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1921)
(citation omitted) (Susquehanna River).
The statutes declaring the Genesee river navigable were
enacted after the State had parted by grant with the title
to the shores and bed of the river. (citation omitted) The
State could not by means of such statutes diminish or destroy without compensation rights of property of the riparian owners derived from such grant (citation omitted).
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People ex rel. Western New York & P. Ry v. State Tax
Comm'n, 244 N.Y. 596, 597, 155 N.E. 911, 912 (1927).
In Morgan v. King, 35 N.Y. 454, 457 (1866), in relation to
a statute declaring the Racquette River to be a "public highway", the court wrote:
[I]t does not provide compensation for taking private
property of the owners of the banks and the bed of the
stream. If, prior to the passage of the act, the stream was
private, in use as in property, the legislature could not
take away the rights of those who were then riparian
owners, nor subject such rights to public use, created or
authorized by the act itself, without compensation. (emphasis added).
In Brown v. Scofield, 8 Barb. 239, 242 (Sup. Gen. T.
1850), an action for obstructing a public river with a dam, the
court rejected a takings challenge against a statute which declared the Canisteo River to be a public highway, saying: "The
statute did not create the [public] right; it only declared what
existed before, and by common law. There was no attempt
made, on the trial, to dispute the right of the public to use the
river as a highway at common law."
But cf.:
Curtis v. Keesler, 14 Barb. 511, 519 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1852),
it was stated that there was a public right of passage on the
Delaware River bounding Sullivan County and on the
Beaverkill, despite the fact that neither was capable of floating boats, rafts or logs "unless swelled by freshets", on the
grounds that "those streams have been declared public highways by statute." The suggestion, at least, is that a statutory
declaration that a stream is a public highway may not necessarily run afoul of the just compensation requirement.
On the effect of a legislative declaration that certain
stream and lake waters are "public highways for the purpose
of floating logs, timber and lumber down those streams," the
court in Brant Lake Shores, Inc. v. Barton, 61 Misc. 2d 902,
907, 307 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970), said "[n]or
does [the enactment]... give anyone a greater right to the use
of the waters of Brant Lake than one had prior to such
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designation."
Other Cases:
Langdon v. Mayor, 93 N.Y. 129, 161 (1883) (grant of
wharfage could not be destroyed by cutting off wharf owner's
water access to the sea without compensation).
6.2.3. If State Has Conveyed the Jus Publicum:
Taking Results - In Appleby v. City of New York, 271
U.S. 364, 399 (1926), the Supreme Court said that, once the
jus publicum has been conveyed, "the city [or state] can only
be revested with them by a condemnation of the rights
granted." Thus, the city, having conveyed the underwater
lands with right to fill, could not now dredge the lands in aid
of navigation under the jus publicum.
In First Constr. Co. of Brooklyn v. State, 221 N.Y. 295,
316, 116 N.E. 1020, 1026 (1917), an action for just compensation for a taking of lands under tidal waters of Gowanus Bay,
the court wrote: "[A]n act granting the right to fill in lands
under water, and thereby acquire title to the same, gives an
inchoate, vested interest in the lands described which is a
property right and.., the grantee cannot be deprived without
compensation."
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